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Abstract 
This CEPS Special Report investigates ways to enhance the legitimacy of economic 
governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) without introducing Treaty 
changes. It suggests changes in the governance framework at both the institutional and 
economic level. Input-oriented legitimacy can be improved by increasing parliamentary 
oversight on decisions related to EMU and increasing the accountability of the Eurogroup. 
Output-oriented legitimacy can be improved by strengthening the ability of EMU to reduce 
the emergence of negative externalities and to mitigate their impact, through market and 
fiscal risk-sharing mechanisms. 
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Executive Summary 
The democratic legitimacy of a polity, institution or policy decision refers to its conformity 
not only to the law in the narrow sense but also to democratic principles and common 
values. The participation of citizens, mainly but not exclusively, through the election of their 
representatives and their ability to hold those elected official accountable lie at the core of the 
concept. Yet, democratic legitimacy is not just about giving a voice to the people, it is also 
about responsiveness. It ultimately depends on the extent to which citizens feel as part of the 
polity under which they live, accept its institutions and support the decisions it 
takes. Therefore, not only ‘input’ but also ‘output’ considerations of the institutions or policy 
decisions under assessment are important. Output legitimacy rests on the ability of 
institutions to deliver results and solve the problems for which they are responsible. For the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), this relates to the ability to avoid or deal with 
negative externalities emerging from shocks in individual countries. 
The crisis in the euro area has exposed serious shortcomings in the output legitimacy of 
EMU, which has always been its main source of legitimacy. The idea that a successful EMU 
is sufficient to ensure its full legitimacy relies on the very assumption that ‘output 
legitimacy’ can compensate for any lack of ‘input legitimacy’. This worked until 2009, but 
then it failed as this system contains an inherent weakness. Every time there is a crisis, the 
output legitimacy deteriorates by definition, making the system vulnerable to a decline in 
citizens’ support. This translates into questions about membership of EMU and the rationale 
for having a monetary union instead of questioning specific policies and actions (the 
government), as would be the case in a nation state. 
Weak input legitimacy has always been a feature of the EMU project as it gave priority to 
the delivery of results over its democratic representativeness. The management of the crisis 
and the creation of a new system of governance that privileged quick fixes and ad hoc 
solutions, but did not aspire to make the process more democratic and fully accountable, 
exacerbated this weakness. The transfer of executive powers to the EU level with the 
objective of solving the euro-area crisis speedily has reduced Member States’ discretion in 
key policy areas and has not been accompanied by the creation of corresponding 
mechanisms to ensure political accountability at EU level. As a result, the democratic 
credentials of the economic governance of EMU have been called into question and citizens’ 
disaffection with the EU has increased.  
                                                   
* Cinzia Alcidi is Head of the Economic Policy unit, Alessandro Giovannini is Associate Researcher 
and Sonia Piedrafita is Research Fellow in the Politics and Institutions unit at CEPS. 
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The combination of low input legitimacy and low output legitimacy is jeopardising support 
for the EU project.  
A fully-fledged political union with fiscal capacity would help to overcome these two sets of 
shortcomings and would also reduce the system’s vulnerability to citizens’ disapproval. It is 
highly unlikely, however, that EMU will become a federal system any time in the near 
future, and even if it did, it is highly uncertain that such a solution would receive the 
political support needed from EU citizens.  
With these caveats in mind, this study examines the main shortcomings in terms of both 
input and output legitimacy of the current EMU governance and proposes 
recommendations to improve its political accountability and a set of conditions to reduce 
negative externalities so as to address citizens’ increasing dissatisfaction and detachment. 
Assessing the legitimacy of the current EMU governance system 
The design of the system of governance since the inception of EMU, either implicitly or 
explicitly, relied on two tightly interlinked fundamental assumptions: the success of EMU is 
a sufficient condition to ensure its legitimacy and rules must be at the core of governance.  
The creation of a rule-based system of governance for EMU can be seen as an attempt to 
replicate the logic of the EU single market regulation. One of its main advantages is the de-
politicisation of the system:  the same rules are agreed and applied to all countries, and 
mechanisms for correction are made as automatic as possible. This eliminates (or at least 
reduces) the need for political decisions at EU level, where political power is dispersed and 
national interests weigh heavily. Political decisions are left at the national level where 
governments have to choose the policies to meet the targets and satisfy the thresholds.    
The most recent changes in European economic governance assume that fiscal and 
macroeconomic matters can be depoliticised. Indeed, they mainly have implied stricter rules 
and procedures which attribute tasks and decision powers to executive bodies justified by 
exceptional circumstances and the need to react quickly. But this in turn has contributed to 
the political crisis. While this dichotomy reflects an approach that is often applied and 
usually accepted at the level of nation states, it raises important legitimacy problems at the 
EU level, where the executive is not accountable to the elected body in the same way as 
national governments are to their respective parliaments.    
More specifically within this process, the Commission has been assigned a central role in 
the assessment of Member States’ performance, the ex-ante surveillance of national policies 
(before approval by the parliaments) and the establishment of corrective actions, all of which 
usually require the involvement and/or the approval of the Council. Given the limited role 
of both the European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments and the diffuse responsibility 
of representatives in the Council vis-à-vis the citizens, this approach magnifies the existing 
limits to EMU input legitimacy. 
It is unclear whether EMU has managed to compensate for such shortcomings with output 
legitimacy. There is no unambiguous evidence of an improved ability of EMU to deal with 
the negative effects of a shock originating in a single country under any of the specific 
circumstances that could arise within the new governance system. Admittedly, this may be 
due to the fact that the crisis is not yet over and the current subdued level of economic 
activity inevitably weighs on this judgement. Moreover, a key purpose of EMU, i.e. its ability 
to reduce the likelihood of future crises, cannot yet be tested.  
With this caveat in mind, we proceed to assess the legitimacy of the new system of 
governance on the basis of different typologies of legitimacy relationships between the EU 
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and the Member States. We employ two dimensions: the degree of EU constraints faced by 
national governments when setting policies that fall under national sovereignty, as this is 
informative about input legitimacy, and the risk of negative spillovers, which is related to 
the degree of output legitimacy. This approach allows us to identify four categories of 
relationship between the Member States and the EU, ranging from the lower to the higher 
level of discretion and from higher to lower risk of negative spill-overs, i) countries under a 
macroeconomic adjustment programme, ii) countries under enhanced budgetary 
surveillance, iii) countries under an excessive deficit procedure (EDP) or excessive imbalance 
procedure (EIP) and iv) countries subject to regular coordination of macroeconomic policies.  
Each category corresponds to one of the procedures foreseen in the new system of 
governance and to different levels of obligations that Member States are currently or can be 
subject to.  
As long as the increased EU executive powers are not accompanied by the corresponding 
mechanisms of political accountability, the stricter the EU interference is, the higher the cost 
in terms of democratic legitimacy. The risk that a country falls into a situation of crisis and 
hence that an idiosyncratic shock generates negative spillover effects on other countries or 
EMU as a whole is the benchmark against which output legitimacy is assessed. This implies 
that the cost of a failure in output legitimacy is larger as the risk of large spillovers is higher. 
Overall the main finding of the exercise is that EU constraints on national discretion increase 
as the risk of (larger) spillovers grows. Put simply, when such risk increases, the EU 
intrusion increases and input legitimacy tends to be weakened. The second finding is that a 
lower input legitimacy is not necessarily offset by higher output legitimacy. The idea that a 
stricter intrusion at EU level should lead to better capacity to deal with externalities is not yet 
backed by robust evidence. 
The exercise also helps to understand the limits of the rule-based system and the idea of 
de-politicisation of EU decisions. It suggests that when an economy moves into 
circumstances of stress and crisis due to the failure of the rule-based system in achieving its 
objective to prevent externalities from happening, decisions of a political nature become 
unavoidable. And for those decisions, due accountability must be ensured.  
More specifically, in the case of countries under a macroeconomic adjustment programme, 
the assessment suggests that input legitimacy may suffer from serious shortcomings. The 
study argues that shortcomings in input legitimacy have not been compensated for by clear 
progress in output legitimacy. Indeed, the outcome of the macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes adopted in different countries has been, at best, mixed: at aggregate level, the 
real economy in most cases has recovered, but it remains weak. It is difficult to disentangle 
how much of the affected countries’ ability to avoid the worst-case scenario should be 
attributed to the programmes and how much to other tools, such as the intervention of the 
European Central Bank (ECB).  
For countries under enhanced budgetary surveillance, the prominent role played by the 
European Commission limits national governments’ capacity to take decisions and poses 
some concerns in terms of political accountability, thereby affecting the degree of input 
legitimacy. It may be still too early to assess whether enhanced budgetary surveillance has 
been effective in preventing the crisis in one country from spilling over to other countries. 
The expectation, of course, is that it should at least contribute to reduce such a risk.  
Input legitimacy is at stake also in the case of the procedures for redressing excessive 
deficits and macroeconomic imbalances, as the powers of the Commission and of the 
Council (admittedly more limited), in terms of the enforcement of corrective measures, 
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reduce the policy discretion of national governments. Even though the rationale for such 
procedures may be justified in terms of output legitimacy, doubts remain on the ability of the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) to prevent negative externalities, as some of the 
scoreboard indicators suffer from serious drawbacks and there is a problem of potential 
enforcement as the procedure is very broad and intrusive, if fully used.  
Input legitimacy is less of an issue in the case of the regular coordination of macroeconomic 
policies, as policy decisions reside by and large in the hands of national governments, with 
the EU mainly exerting peer pressure and suggesting (non-binding) recommendations. 
While policy coordination appears to be fully justified in this case, it has nevertheless proven 
difficult to find supporting empirical evidence in favour of increased output legitimacy. 
Against this background, the study explores potential improvements in the economic 
governance framework of EMU and suggests policy changes both at the institutional and 
economic levels.  
Improving input legitimacy 
The input-oriented legitimacy of EMU can be improved by strengthening the involvement 
of the EP in the European Semester, in the scrutiny of the macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes as well as by enhancing the Parliament’s oversight of the European Council, the 
Eurogroup and, where appropriate, the ECB.  
In the context of the European Semester, the EP should exert a stronger role in establishing 
the EU’s economic priorities and in the parliamentary oversight of the country-specific 
recommendations, in particular their implementation phase. The so-called ‘troika’ model, 
assuming it will be maintained, has to be adapted to the new provisions in the six- and the 
two-pack. The Commission should make an (ex-post) assessment not only of the 
implementation of its policy recommendations, but also of whether they effectively 
promoted the return of the economy to a sustainable path. The involvement and 
responsibilities of the Eurogroup and the ECB should be spelled out more clearly.   
The parliamentary oversight of the European Council and the Eurogroup can be improved 
through better use of the economic dialogues with their Presidents on EMU decisions and 
policy actions. An exchange of views with the President of the Eurogroup and the Managing 
Director of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) could improve the political 
accountability of this body. The agreed mechanisms for the oversight of the ECB’s 
supervisory powers and the Resolution Board should be used to their full potential.  
In order to perform these tasks satisfactorily, the EP needs to be endowed with the necessary 
resources and its organisational structures upgraded. The creation of a subcommittee of the 
European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the scrutiny of 
EMU with MEPs from the euro area would facilitate the performance of all these tasks. It 
would also allow for a more effective format of inter-parliamentary cooperation with (and 
among) the national parliaments of euro-area countries.  
Finally the selection of the President of the Commission through the European elections 
could increase the political capital of the EP and citizens’ interest in the elections and support 
for the EU. The limited impact of the initiative in this year’s elections, however, has exposed 
some shortcomings such as whether the top candidates of the European political groups can 
convince and mobilise citizens without a clear political programme that they can later 
implement, or without the full support of the leaders of the national parties.  
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Improving output legitimacy 
The output-oriented legitimacy can be improved by strengthening the ability of EMU to 
dampen the adverse effects of (negative) externalities, largely stemming from country-
specific idiosyncratic shocks. For this purpose, enhanced financial integration can serve as an 
important tool for sharing market risk. Endowing EMU with a fiscal capacity would help to 
stabilise macroeconomic fluctuations.   
Regarding financial integration, the debate so far has mainly focused on the volume of cross-
border financial flows, regardless of their nature, and on key elements of a banking union. 
The main purpose of the latter is to make a firm break in the linkages between the sovereigns 
and the banks. But for the purpose of sharing market risks, the ‘quantity’ of financial 
integration is likely to be less important than its ‘quality’. Indeed, if risks materialise, equity 
market integration entails a different capacity of absorbing losses than debt-financing 
through bank intermediation. Well-functioning risk-sharing mechanisms should be 
complemented by common fiscal instruments to absorb and mitigate the effects of negative 
externalities. A common EMU insurance scheme to counter idiosyncratic shocks can 
represent the starting point for more complex policy instruments, which have proved 
successful in other monetary unions. 
Financial and fiscal mechanisms of risk-sharing can reduce the risk that a shock originating 
in one sector or country triggers a cascade of adverse effects in other countries and/or 
sectors, eventually leading to a euro-area crisis and challenging the output-oriented 
legitimacy of EMU. This aspect is particularly relevant in the absence of a political (and 
fiscal) union, although not only in that context. All successful federations usually have both 
kinds of mechanisms in place.  
One solution is to undertake institutional reforms aimed at reducing the risk that an 
idiosyncratic shock turns into a systemic shock. This could be achieved through the creation 
of a fully-fledged banking union and the development of more effective market-based 
systems of risk-sharing. 
A second avenue, which implies deeper changes, considers the option of equipping EMU 
with additional institutions in charge of tackling negative externalities associated with 
idiosyncratic shocks that could hamper the smooth functioning of the monetary union. This 
could be achieved by endowing EMU with a proper fiscal capacity, e.g. through the 
establishment of a European unemployment insurance scheme. 
Conclusions 
Overall, under the assumption that a political union is not a viable solution in the near term 
to solve legitimacy issues of EMU institutions, there can and should be room to improve on 
specific aspects of EMU legitimacy. While this may not be the optimal solution, the 
recommended improvements would represent a step towards more democratic and effective 
governance of EMU and one that is likely to enhance citizens’ support, the latter of which 
remains a precondition of a successful monetary union. The suggested improvements would 
also facilitate the introduction of any further substantial changes at the institutional level, 
including a political and fiscal union. 
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1. Introduction 
The unprecedented financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis and 
economic recession have represented a severe test for the entire architecture of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU).1 This was not the first time that strong tensions had shaken the 
EU architecture and its economy. The Werner Plan2 and the ‘snake in the tunnel’3 offered 
earlier examples of failed attempts to create a monetary union in the 1970s. Although the 
lack of success was later explained by the exclusive reliance on monetary mechanisms and 
the absence of an adequate fiscal regime, the preparations to create the euro in the 1990s 
followed exactly the same approach. The conviction that the rule-based constraints, built into 
national budgets by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), were sufficient to prevent fiscal 
deficits from undermining the stability of EMU dominated opposite views. Proponents of the 
euro largely disregarded the fact that monetary unions of existing advanced federations 
were buttressed by federal budgets on the order of 20-25% of GDP, complemented by fully-
fledged banking unions.4 
The financial and economic crisis unveiled the main flaws of the existing governance 
system5, the lack of common resources and macroeconomic stabilisation mechanisms like 
inter-state redistribution functions and effective risk-sharing mechanisms typical of 
successful federations. 
As the severity of the crisis unfolded, exceptional and unprecedented measures had 
therefore to be taken. These ranged from enhancing the coordination of macroeconomic 
policy of the Member States, to the establishment of financial assistance mechanisms, to 
European Central Bank’s (ECB) interventions to support distressed banks and to the 
                                                   
1 The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) refers to the coordination of economic policies and the 
adoption of a common monetary policy and, eventually, the euro by EU Member States. Both the 
(current) 18 euro area Member States and the 10 non-euro Member States are members of EMU. A 
Member State, however, needs to comply and be a part of the "third EMU stage", before being able 
to adopt the euro. All Member States of the European Union, except Denmark and the United 
Kingdom, have committed themselves by treaty to join the "third EMU stage". 
2 The Werner group submitted its final report in October 1970, setting out a three-stage process to 
achieve EMU within a 10-year period. The final objective was the irreversible convertibility of 
currencies, free movement of capital and the permanent locking of exchange rates – or possibly a 
single currency. To achieve this, the report called for closer economic policy coordination, with 
interest rates and management of reserves decided at Community level, as well as agreed 
frameworks for national budgetary policies. For details, see 
http://aei.pitt.edu/1002/1/monetary_werner_final.pdf. 
3 In March 1972, the Member States created the ‘snake in the tunnel’. This was a mechanism for 
managing fluctuations of their currencies (the snake) inside narrow limits against the dollar (the 
tunnel). Hit by oil crises, policy divergences and dollar weakness, within two years the snake had 
lost many of its component parts and was little more than a German-mark zone comprising 
Germany, Denmark and the Benelux countries. 
4 As early as 1977, the MacDougall Report (European Commission, 1977) had pointed out that 
federal budgets in Germany and the US were of a comparable size and that a Federation in Europe 
should have a common budget of a similar magnitude. However, in the early stages of the 
Federation, public expenditure was conceived at Community level at about 5-7% of GDP (and 
around 10% if defence were to be included) of GDP and in the pre-federal period at 2-4%.  
5 It should however be recognised that despite its deepest crisis in post-war times, none of the worst-
case scenarios predicted for the euro area has materialised. In fact, EMU even managed to add a 
new member, Latvia, in 2014. 
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redesign of financial markets regulation. The pressure exerted on policy-makers by the size 
and depth of the crisis resulted in the complete overhaul of EU economic governance hardly 
conceivable few years before. Member States reached an agreement on pooling public 
resources to assist governments at risk of default, on the establishment of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for financial institutions and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) for banks setting up the main pillars of a banking union. 
However, serious challenges remain on both the economic and the institutional front. The 
governance system in place since the inception of EMU, implicitly or explicitly, relied on two 
tightly interlinked fundamental principles: the creation of a rule-based system of governance 
and the assumption that the success of EMU will be sufficient to ensure its legitimacy.  
The creation of a rule-based system of governance for EMU can be seen as an attempt to 
replicate the logic of the EU single market regulation. The latter has successfully worked 
over time fostering economic integration and creating conditions for a level playing field 
across countries. One of the main advantages of a rule-based system is the de-politicisation 
of decisions. The same rules, with targets and thresholds, are agreed and applied to all 
countries and mechanisms for correction are made as automatic as possible. This eliminates 
(or at least reduces) the need for political interference from the EU level, where political 
power is dispersed and national interests weigh heavily. Political decisions are left in the 
hands of the national governments, which have the political responsibility to choose the 
policies to meet the requested targets and satisfy the thresholds. 
The question is whether fiscal and more in general macroeconomic matters can really be 
depoliticised. The recent history of EU governance suggests that this is the case. Indeed 
coordination of macro-fiscal policies has largely implied sharing common rules, most of the 
time, stricter rules. The problem is that the duration of the crisis and depth of the recession 
are severely putting into question the desirability and the benefits of such common rules. 
This is contributing to shift the debate from sharing rules towards the creation of common 
tools to mitigate the effects of shocks. 
The creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), the debate about the fiscal capacity of the Union and the resolution 
mechanism and fund for banks represent deviations from this idea of having a rule-based 
system in favour of a governance framework where the optimal sharing of risks is key and 
may also entail sharing resources.  
While sharing rules have been accepted, on the front of sharing public resources, 
compromises have dominated over success. Indeed, both the EFSF and the ESM are 
mechanisms designed to share risks, but not resources. EFSF and ESM resources are meant to 
grant loans later to be repaid by the borrowers. Sharing resources without a central fiscal 
authority in charge of taxation and redistribution remains unacceptable to several Member 
States as the solution is perceived as a way to de facto transform EMU into a transfer Union. 
Yet, the severity of the crisis and the need to avert the failure of EMU called for a shift of the 
traditional approach based only on rules. This last point brings into the picture the issue of 
legitimacy of EMU governance, namely the idea that a successful EMU is sufficient to ensure 
its legitimacy to the extent that the delivery in terms of ‘output legitimacy’ can compensate 
for the deficiency in terms of ‘input legitimacy’. While this governance framework seemed to 
work until 2009, it features a built-in weakness: with the deepening of a crisis, output 
legitimacy deteriorates almost by definition, making the system vulnerable to changes in 
citizens’ support. If poor delivery of outcomes persists, the very benefits of EMU 
membership and its rationale may be questioned rather than the lack of effectiveness of 
specific policies and government actions, as would be the case at the national level. 
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The overhaul of EU governance and the steps taken so far towards a banking union may still 
fall short of creating an economic and monetary union endowed with the minimum 
institutional and democratic standards to ensure its long-term well-functioning. Already the 
“Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and Monetary Union”,6 recognised that further 
work was needed to strengthen the democratic legitimacy, accountability and scrutiny of the 
EMU project.  
Overall, the new economic governance has resulted in a shift of powers from the Member 
States to the EU level. This has not been accompanied, by an adequate re-allocation of 
competences between the key EU institutions (the Commission, the Council and the 
European Parliament),7 partly because inter-governmentalism has prevailed over the 
community method8 in the design of the reform of EU governance. 
Most of the changes in the EU governance framework have been characterised by a 
‘disconnect’ with the electorate. This disconnect attracted a great deal of attention in the 
aftermath of the crisis and is, de facto, an old, basic feature of the original EMU project. EMU 
was originally presented to the European citizens both as a highly technical project best dealt 
with by technocrats (the ECB is the main product of this approach9) and the most important 
political project to secure Europe’s future.10 This dual nature of the EMU project was in 
practice reflected in the net separation between monetary and fiscal policy: monetary policy 
was assigned to the technocrats and centralised in the ECB, whereas fiscal policy, where the 
political dimension is key, remained close to the electorate, hence a task for national 
governments. This design was consistent with the absence of a central political power. 
Strict separation between monetary and fiscal policy may work well in ‘normal’ times. In 
times of severe crisis, however, that separation may become artificial and blurred. Indeed, 
even a strongly independent central bank may be forced to take decisions that have fiscal or 
                                                   
6 European Commission (2012). The report points to a stable architecture of EMU in the “financial, 
fiscal, economic and political domains”, yet notes that the most critical concepts remain vague. 
7 The Lisbon Treaty was supposed to deal with the issue of the democratic deficit intrinsic in the 
Maastricht Treaty by conferring larger competences to the European Parliament. While this has 
certainly happened, the new system of economic governance that emerged from the six-pack and 
two-pack legislation has seen executive powers (Commission) increasing their competences well 
beyond what was originally foreseen in the new Treaty and without a corresponding increase in 
the accountability, in particular towards national and European parliaments.  
8 The community method is based on the premise that the Commission proposes, the European 
Parliament co-legislates with the Council and the Court of Justice ensures a common interpretation 
of EU law. The inter-governmental method refers to the process where the decisions are basically 
taken by the member governments represented in the Council or the European Council.  
9 A fully technocratic central bank was justified by the need to ensure policy independence (so-
called ‘monetary dominance’ over fiscal policy). This was considered a crucial condition (for 
Germany) in order to reach an agreement on EMU, to minimise the risk of monetisation of national 
governments’ debt (see for instance Sargent and Wallace, 1981) as well as to force the ﬁscal 
authorities to adjust their balance sheet rather than rely on inﬂation. It was never explicitly 
recognised until the crisis hit (in fact it was denied), but under this framework countries can 
default. The combination of the no bail-out clause and monetary independence of the central bank 
under a fixed exchange rate regime implies that while the risk of inflation is minimised, the risk of 
liquidity is high and can turn into insolvency if there is no lender of last resort. See De Grauwe 
(2012) on this point. 
10 The political project argument was often used in response to those (especially US economists) 
pointing to the failure of EMU to meet the economic criteria for being an optimum currency area. 
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quasi-fiscal implications without being accountable to any democratic institution. Many 
observers11 claim that a full fiscal and political union is needed exactly to avoid the 
occurrence of such circumstances. Only if citizens have a say in the formulation of policies to 
which they are subject can EMU succeed and prosper.  
The problem is that while a fiscal and political union must be seen by many as “the” 
desirable policy option, it is unlikely to be a realistic option any time soon, awkwardly 
enough, also because European citizens do not show much appetite for it. The lack of will at 
the level of national governments mirrors adverse feeling of the European electorate, who 
does not appear to be in favour of giving up national sovereignty to overcome the existing 
disconnect between the European and national level. This may be especially true in the 
current situation, as the persisting subdued level of economic activity has further weakened 
an already-feeble motivation among EU citizens to move towards the United States of 
Europe. National electorates may find it even more difficult to vote for representatives 
whose role in the decision-making process they do not fully understand. Moreover, the 
division between creditor and debtor countries brought about by the sovereign debt crisis 
may have undermined the belief that a common European interest really exists in key 
domains of public policy and that specific interests of debtors and creditors can actually be 
reconciled. The outcome of the 2014 European elections seems to point exactly in this 
direction. 
Hence a first question is: How can the democratic accountability of EU institutions (i.e. the 
input legitimacy of EMU governance) be enhanced in the medium term, under the 
assumption that a political union is not a feasible option in the near future? 
To answer this question, this study intentionally avoids discussing federal solutions for 
EMU, as suggested for example in the proposals made by the Padoa-Schioppa Group (2012), 
the Glienicker Group (2013) or the Group Eiffel Europe (2014), albeit with important 
differences. By contrast, it considers a more partial and feasible solution, focusing on policy 
mechanisms and institutions (but not necessarily fiscal ones) that share two key features: i) 
they must promote a better functioning of EMU and ii) they must ensure the highest degree 
of legitimacy in the existing Treaty framework. 
The reports starts from the conviction that a well-functioning EMU must deliver results that 
meet the expectations of citizens and receive the support of the Member States. This 
conviction is naturally and deeply intertwined with the objective of building an EMU 
endowed with legitimacy. And the issue of EMU legitimacy has been hardly questioned 
since the outbreak of the crisis.  
As mentioned above, the attempt to fix the weaknesses of EMU governance highlighted by 
the crisis has revived concerns about the democratic deficit of EU institutions. The deficit of 
EMU in terms input legitimacy has been reinforced by its low level of output legitimacy, 
with doubts mounting about whether EMU is able to deliver good outcomes for its citizens.  
In order to answer the question above, the study examines the constraints that the new 
regulatory framework imposes on national governments’ discretion and the role and 
political accountability of EU institutions (e.g. the Commission and the ECB) and related 
bodies (e.g. the Eurogroup and the Troika12).  
                                                   
11 See for instance De Grauwe (2013) among others. 
12 The cooperation between the IMF, the European Commission and the ECB in the context of 
adjustment programmes for troubled euro-area Member States has become known as the ‘Troika’. 
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The need for EMU to deliver results has become even more compelling in recent years 
because the low level of input legitimacy calls for stronger output legitimacy. Therefore, a 
second question is: How can the delivery of policy outcomes by EU institutions (i.e. the 
output legitimacy of EMU governance) be enhanced in the medium term in a context of 
limited democratic accountability?  
Addressing the second question requires an analysis of risk-sharing mechanisms for an 
economic and monetary union and how they can be best designed. The key point is that 
strong economic and financial integration especially among countries sharing a single 
currency and a single monetary policy is a source of externalities: the effects of a shock 
occurring in a certain country/sector (also as a result of a policy decision) can propagate 
beyond national borders or sectors. As policies are either a source of a shock or a response to 
a shock, in the current institutional set-up, national governments must be held responsible 
also towards the rest of the Union. Only the delicate balance of managing national and EU 
responsibilities can ensure the smooth functioning of EMU. The crisis has proved that such 
equilibrium may be very unstable. The presence of externalities is the main rationale for the 
coordination of economic policies and sharing financial resources. If a fiscal union is not a 
viable solution, the way forward requires the setting up of an institutional framework that 
reduces the likelihood of externalities and at the same time allows for a common safety net 
that is able to mitigate the effect of those externalities. The latter has to be designed in a 
manner that does not lead to systematic transfers of resources. 
The rest of this study is organised as follows. The next section presents the multiple layers of 
the new EMU governance framework, according to taxonomy and an assessment of 
legitimacy relationships between Member States and the EU. It then examines the role of the 
main decision-makers and assesses whether a low degree of input legitimacy can be 
compensated by relatively high level of output legitimacy. Section 3 examines ways to 
improve the input legitimacy of EMU governance in view of these findings and, in 
particular, how to strengthen the accountability role of the EP. Section 4 assesses different 
options to overcome the flaws in the functioning of EMU governance and improve its ability 
to deliver the expected policy outcomes, essentially by internalising and mitigating the 
adverse effects of negative asymmetric shocks. The concluding section provides a summary 
of the main arguments and offers some policy recommendations. 
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2. Legitimacy assessment of the current economic governance of EMU 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The establishment of the new system of EMU governance has affected the relationship 
between the Member States and the EU and raised questions in terms of legitimacy.  
 Four typologies of such relationship can be distinguished. Countries under: i) 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes, ii) enhanced budgetary surveillance, iii) 
excessive deficit procedure or excessive imbalance procedure and, iv) regular 
coordination of macroeconomic policies. 
 Overall, regarding input-oriented legitimacy, political accountability is weaker and 
policy discretion at Member State level is lower, the closer to circumstances of crisis. 
By contrast, in normal times, EU constraints on matters of national sovereignty are 
limited. As regards the output legitimacy, the results are mixed and there is no strong 
evidence so far that EMU has improved its ability to deal with spillovers under any of 
the specific circumstances.    
 In the case of countries under a macroeconomic adjustment programme, 
responsibilities in the Troika are not clear-cut and those taking decisions are not 
accountable for their actions. Such shortcomings have not been fully compensated for 
by clear progress in terms of output legitimacy.   
 The Commission’s prominent role in assessing and deciding whether to open an 
enhanced budgetary surveillance procedure, which imposes significant constraints on 
a Member State’s range of policy discretion, can lead to serious legitimacy issues. In 
terms of output legitimacy, the procedure should reduce the risk of crisis spreading to 
other Member States, although it is still too early to judge with any certainty. 
 The heavy role of the Commission and the limited capacity of the Council to reverse its 
decisions in the excessive deficit procedure and the excessive imbalance procedure 
diminish the input legitimacy in view of the subsequent obligations imposed on 
Member States. In terms of output legitimacy, while the rationale for such procedures 
is not questioned, it is doubtful that an MIP can prevent negative externalities. 
 In the case of regular coordination and surveillance of macroeconomic policies, the 
Commission’s role is limited to monitoring, and Member State governments enjoy high 
discretion. In terms of output legitimacy, while coordination is in theory fully justified, 
positive results are still lacking.  
 
When the global financial crisis turned into the sovereign debt crisis at the beginning of 2010, 
the EU’s policy response was largely based on three pillars: i) providing financial assistance 
to countries in crisis (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus), ii) strengthening controls over 
member countries’ economic policies and iii) stabilising monetary and financial market 
conditions. The design of a policy response for the first two was mainly assigned to the 
European Commission, the Council and the European Council (therefore with the 
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involvement of national governments). The design of a policy response for the third fell 
largely under the responsibility of the European Central Bank.13 
Large economic crises usually cause large losses in countries’ income and citizens’ welfare. 
But they also offer the opportunity to promote reforms otherwise considered politically 
infeasible. The EMU crisis was not an exception in this respect. In the wake of the crisis, 
European institutions and national governments hastened to introduce changes aiming, on 
the one hand, to manage the crisis and, on the other hand, to establish a new system of 
governance that would prevent other crises from occurring.  
Some problems quickly arose, however. First, the need to clearly separate competencies and 
to define the terms of interaction of the different institutional players, EU bodies and 
national governments, which often proved to be in tension. Second, while most decisions 
were driven by the urgency to fix compelling problems, issues of legitimacy,14 a hallmark of 
democratic institutions, cannot any longer be ignored. 
The focus of this section is to examine how recent developments in EMU governance affected 
the relationship between the EU/EMU levels and Member States through the lens of the 
input/output legitimacy. Indeed while literature on the new system of the governance has 
flourished in the recent times, the legitimacy issues it entails have not been fully 
investigated. For this purpose, the concepts of legitimacy and accountability are shortly 
reviewed beforehand and the description of the main developments of the EMU governance 
system is also presented. 
 New balances and legitimacy challenges in the development of the 
current EMU governance 
Since the EU is a political and economic ‘experiment’ without historical precedents, the 
construction of a common governance framework has not always followed a straight line. 
The resulting current governance framework is a complex institutional architecture, which at 
times experiences political paralysis largely stemming from tensions between different 
institutional levels and polarisation of national interests over the common interest.  
As a response to the economic and financial crisis, the structure of EU economic governance 
has been strengthened and has become more complex. Soon after the entry into force of the 
                                                   
13 In this third line of action, two decisions in particular were key: i) the decision to create an 
integrated system of banking supervision at the European level (the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism, SSM) and the common European framework for bank resolution (the Single 
Resolution Mechanism, SRM), as two steps towards the realisation of a banking union; and ii) the 
decision of the ECB to undertake Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) to stabilise the financial 
markets and to ensure the functioning of the transmission mechanism of the single monetary 
policy. Despite the crucial importance of these policies, most notably the creation of the banking 
union, this section does not intend to deal specifically with these aspects of governance. They are 
addressed more specifically in sections 3 and 4, both in terms of institutional and economic 
analysis. 
14 In assessing the legitimacy in the framework of the EMU governance system, three dimensions 
should be considered: institutional, economic and legal. This report focuses only on the first two. In 
particular, developments on the judicial review of EMU mechanisms and how they are challenged 
by constitutional courts (and especially the German Court) are not addressed here. Nor do we 
consider the issue of whether the possibility to hold a judicial review would be sufficient to balance 
the absence of effective political accountability. For a review of these aspects, see Fabrini (2013), 
Pernice (2014) and Bardutzky and Fahey (2014).  
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Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the severity of the recession and the need to act quickly required to 
resort tools and policy instruments not yet envisaged by the Treaties.  
It was evident that the optimal solution to the crisis – a full fiscal and political union to 
complement the monetary union – would not have materialised quickly. Therefore, the 
resulting strategy consisted in strengthening of the current governance framework to better 
ensure the soundness and coherence of Member States’ fiscal and macroeconomic policies. In 
particular, the reforms of EMU governance focused on enforcing both the preventive and 
corrective arms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to safeguard fiscal discipline as well 
as complementing it with the excessive imbalances procedure (EIP) to prevent the 
emergency and persistence of macroeconomic imbalances and divergent competitiveness 
trends. In broad terms, this approach reaffirmed the design of EMU economic governance 
according to a rule-based system, aiming at reducing the risk of idiosyncratic shocks.  
It is worth noting that the suggested changes in the governance framework for EMU have 
been triggered as a response to the euro area (not EU) crisis as the lack of the exchange rate 
as a policy instrument amplifies the adverse effects of negative externalities. However the 
EMU does not have “its own institutions”, EU institutions are EMU institutions. The new 
framework is therefore a very complex system of EU governance with different layers of 
legislation, including the six-pack, the two-pack, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG) and an overlapping of 
competences at EU and euro-area level, often difficult to disentangle.  
In what follows we briefly review the main features of this governance framework. Table 1 
presents a snapshot of the main elements of the emerging system of EU economic 
governance, highlighting their different characteristics. Table 2 lists the legislative acts that 
comprise the six and the two-packs. 
The six-pack consists of five regulations and one directive (see Table 2). It reinforces both 
fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance by setting up the European Semester for Economic 
Policy Coordination under which budget plans and reform programmes are scrutinised ex-
ante by the Commission to make sure that fiscal targets are not jeopardised and excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances are prevented. The six-pack applies to all EU Member States, 
with specific provisions regarding the macroeconomic indicators and the financial sanctions 
for the euro-area Member States. Building on the Treaties, the two-pack further enhances the 
control and coordination of the budgetary policies of the euro area and streamlines the 
surveillance procedures of those member countries facing severe financial difficulties. The 
TSCG15 requires signatory states to implement a balanced budget rule in their national 
legislation through permanent, binding provisions, preferably of a constitutional character.16 
As regards non-euro area members, Denmark and Romania are bound by the fiscal 
provisions, while these provisions will only apply to the remaining non-euro area states 
when they adopt the euro. Conversely the Euro-Plus Pact agreed in 2011 is just a 
commitment of signatories (all euro-area Member States plus Bulgaria, Denmark, Lithuania, 
Poland and Romania) to stronger economic coordination. 
                                                   
15 TSCG was signed by all Member States at that time, except the Czech Republic and the United 
Kingdom.  
16 The ‘balanced budget rule’ obliges the general state budget to be balanced or in surplus, that is, 
that the annual structural deficit does not exceed the 0.5% of the GDP, or the 1% when debt levels 
are significantly below 60%. The ‘debt brake rule’ establishes specific obligations and timing to 
reduce the ratio of government debt-to-GDP when this exceeds the 60% limit. 
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Table 1. Summary of the system of economic governance 
LEGISLATIVE 
TOOL 
LEGISLATIVE 
STRENGTH 
CONTENT TO 
WHOM 
IT 
APPLIES 
ENFORCEMENT  
Stability and 
Growth Pact  
Primary 
legislation 
+ 
Secondary 
legislation 
Framework for the coordination of 
national fiscal policies. It has the objective 
to safeguard sound public finances, on the 
principle that economic policies are a 
matter of shared concern for all Member 
States.  
28 EU 
countries 
 
 
Non-compliance 
with either the 
preventive or 
corrective arms 
can lead to the 
imposition of 
sanctions for 
euro area 
Member States. 
In the case of the 
corrective arm, 
this can involve 
annual fines for 
euro area 
Member States 
and, for all 
countries, 
possible 
suspension of 
Cohesion Fund 
financing until 
the excessive is 
corrected. 
Six-Pack: MIP Secondary 
legislation  
i) Enforcement measures to correct 
excessive macroeconomic imbalances in 
the euro are; and ii) Prevention and 
correction of macroeconomic imbalances 
EU 28 + 
euro area 
specific 
provisions 
Six-Pack: 
Revised SGP  
Secondary 
legislation 
i) Enforcement of budgetary surveillance 
in the euro area; ii) strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies; iii) Speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit 
procedure; and iv) Requirements for 
budgetary frameworks 
EU 28 + 
euro area 
specific 
provisions 
Two-Pack Secondary 
legislation 
i) Strengthen of economic and budgetary 
surveillance of Member States in the euro 
area experiencing or threatened with 
serious difficulties with respect to their 
financial stability; and ii) Common 
provisions for monitoring and assessing 
draft budgetary plans and ensuring the 
correction of excessive deficit of the 
Member States in the euro area 
Euro area 
Member 
States 
TSCG  
(Fiscal 
Compact) 
Inter-
governmental 
Treaty  
It requires Member States to enshrine in 
national law a balanced budget rule with a 
lower limit of a structural deficit of 0.5% 
GDP, centred on the concept of the 
country-specific medium-term objective. It 
increases the role of independent bodies to 
monitor compliance with the national 
fiscal rules. 
25 EU 
Member 
States (no 
UK and 
CZ)  
Maximum once 
the principle is 
part of national 
constitutions 
Euro plus Pact 
(2011) 
Statement  Commitment to stronger economic 
coordination for competitiveness and 
convergence, also in areas of national 
competence, with concrete goals agreed on 
and reviewed on a yearly basis by Heads 
of State or Government. The Euro Plus 
Pact is integrated into the European 
semester and the Commission monitors 
implementation of the commitments. 
euro area 
Member 
States + 
BG, DK, 
LT, PO 
and RO  
Non-binding 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table 2. The six-pack and the two-pack in a nutshell 
LEGISLATIVE ACT DATE TITLE LEGAL BASIS 
SIX-PACK 
Regulation (EU) No 
1173/2011 of the European 
Parliament and the Council  
16/11/ 2011 On the effective enforcement of 
budgetary surveillance in the euro 
area 
Art. 121.6 TFEU 
Regulation (EU) No 
1174/2011 of the European 
Parliament and the Council  
16/11/2011 On enforcement measures to correct 
excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances in the euro area 
Art. 121.6 TFEU 
Regulation (EU) No 
1175/2011 of the European 
Parliament and the Council  
16/11/2011 Amending Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1466/97 on the strengthening of 
the surveillance of budgetary 
positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies 
Art. 121.6 TFEU 
Regulation (EU) No 
1176/2011 of the European 
Parliament and the Council 
16/11/2011 On the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances 
Art. 121.6 TFEU 
Council Regulation (EU) No 
1177/2011 
08/11/2011 Amending Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1467/97 on speeding up and 
clarifying the implementation of the 
excessive deficit procedure 
Art. 126.14 TFEU 
Council Directive 
2011/85/EU  
08/11/2011 On requirements for budgetary 
frameworks of the Member States 
Art. 126.14 TFEU 
TWO-PACK 
Regulation (EU) No 
472/2013 of the European 
Parliament and the Council  
21/05/2013 On the strengthening of economic 
and budgetary surveillance of EU 
Member States in the euro area 
experiencing or threatened with 
serious difficulties with respect to 
their financial stability 
Art. 136 and 121.6 
TFEU 
Regulation (EU) No 
473/2013 of the European 
Parliament and the Council  
21/05/2013 On common provisions for 
monitoring and assessing draft 
budgetary plans and ensuring the 
correction of excessive deficit of the 
EU Member States in the euro area 
Art. 136 and 121.6 
TFEU 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
This complex interconnection of primary and secondary EU legislation combined with 
intergovernmental treaties has the common objective to strengthen the economic 
coordination and fiscal discipline, particularly for the Member States sharing the single 
currency, either by increasing the constraint that the European Commission can impose on 
the budgetary powers of the national governments or by ensuring that Member States 
commit in the strongest manner, i.e. with commitments in their national constitutional law.  
This new integrated system of rules (introduced by the three pieces of legislation above) is 
grounded in the European Semester, which sets the timeline for policy coordination in the 
EU.   
The European Semester assigns different tasks to different European institutions. The 
European Commission plays a key role by providing background information for the 
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assessment of the countries’ economic situation and policies at the start of the cycle and by 
drafting the country-specific recommendations. The role of the European Council is first to 
provide policy orientation and then to formally adopt final country-specific 
recommendations. The EP has a rather marginal role in the process, chiefly that of 
formulating an opinion on the Annual Growth Survey (AGS). Meetings between the EP and 
national parliaments can take place both in the pre-spring Council (of the ECON, EMPL & 
BUDG Committees) and the ECON meetings in September, but the aim is only to discuss 
national policies under the Semester Cycle. In the framework of the European semester, euro 
area Member States also have to submit to the Commission their draft budgetary plans (in 
October before submitting them to national parliaments) to assess whether they are in line 
with the recommendations of the European Semester.17 The Commission’s assessment is then 
discussed by the Eurogroup. In the various phases of the process, different sanctions for non-
compliant Member States are envisaged, which are proposed by the Commission and 
adopted by the Council.  
There is little doubt that in terms of staff and technical competences, the European 
Commission is best placed for the monitoring and surveillance of Member States’ economic 
situation and policies. Moreover its status as an independent body that acts in the general 
interest of the Union with complete independence from national governments (Art. 17 Treaty 
of European Union (TEU)) should ensure that such a process is carried out in effective 
fashion. Monitoring and assessing an economy under adverse economic conditions may, 
however, be less objective and more complicated than one would expect. Even quantitative 
indicators, like those included in the MIP, are seldom as clear-cut as they might seem at first 
glance. The assessment exercise may therefore implicitly incorporate a political dimension 
and raise key legitimacy issues, if accountability is not ensured. In a situation of increasing 
constraints for national budgetary policies and policy-making discretion, the strong powers 
of the (European) Council and the relatively weak role of the EP make these legitimacy 
issues of particular concern.  
The recent changes in the governance framework of EMU have affected significantly the 
relationship between the EU and its Member States and raise the issue of whether suggested 
policy decisions fulfil the principle of democratic legitimacy. This issue is examined in 
section 0, which considers the main procedures foreseen in the framework of the current 
governance and tries to assess the degree of legitimacy associated with each of them. Before 
moving to this discussion, section 2.2 briefly explains the concepts of legitimacy and 
accountability. 
 Input legitimacy, output legitimacy and accountability 
When discussing the issue of legitimacy, it is first necessary to explain the concept. Suchman 
(1995) defined democratic legitimacy as “the assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable and fit within a structured system of social norms, values, beliefs and thoughts”. 
Beetham (1991) distinguished three standards of legitimacy that apply to liberal democracies: 
output legitimacy, that is, their capacity to deliver results and improve citizens’ welfare; 
substantial legitimacy, that is, the protection and promotion of collective values and common 
identity; and procedural legitimacy, that is, respect for the democratic principles of 
representation and checks-and-balances. Scharpf (1999) approached EU legitimacy by 
collapsing the three previous standards into two dimensions, namely input and output 
legitimacy. In order to be legitimate, the EU political system, institutions and decision-
                                                   
17 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/images/european_semester_en.htm 
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making process should be democratic and effective, i.e. shall reflect the will of the people 
(‘government by the people’ or input legitimacy) and promote the common welfare 
(‘government for the people’ or output legitimacy).  
In a nutshell, input legitimacy rests on the participation of citizens to the decision process, 
mainly but not exclusively, through the election of their representatives and their capacity to 
hold them accountable. Output legitimacy rests on the ability of institutions and executive 
bodies to deliver the expected results. In a liberal democracy, political parties formulate 
policy programmes on behalf of the electorate, which in turn delivers a mandate to form the 
national government.  
In the EU context, citizens elect their representatives in the EP in direct elections and are also 
indirectly represented in the Council and the European Council through their national 
governments. The EP and the Council exercise equal powers in the ordinary legislative 
procedure, which applies to most EU legislation since the Lisbon Treaty. In the EU, the 
governments represented in the European Council and the Council are politically 
accountable to their national parliaments and citizens. The EP also exercises functions of 
political control as laid down in the Treaties (Art. 14.1 TEU). In particular, the Commission is 
responsible to the EP, which may force the Commission as a body to resign through a motion 
of censure (Art. 17 TEU). 
Yet, democratic legitimacy is not just about giving a voice to the people but also about 
responsiveness. Overall, democratic legitimacy depends ultimately on the extent to which 
citizens feel to be part of the polity in which they live and accept its institutions.  
All political systems rely on a mixture of input- and output-oriented legitimacy, but the 
institutional architecture of the EU has traditionally prioritised the output legitimacy. While 
the transfer of additional powers to the EU has always sparked demands for enhancing input 
legitimacy and democratic accountability of EU institutions, these demands emerge strongly 
in times of crisis as citizens perceive more neatly that EU institutions are not delivering the 
expected outcomes.  
The management of the economic and financial crisis has revealed shortcomings both as 
regards the output and the input legitimacy of EU governance. The new governance system 
has conferred additional powers on the European Commission and the decision-making has 
privileged the intergovernmental approach over the community method, raising questions 
on the representativeness and accountability of the decision-making process. The 
Commission is not a democratically elected body or fully accountable to the EP in the way 
national governments are vis-á-vis their respective legislative bodies. Governments 
represented in the Council and the European Council certainly enjoy the democratic 
legitimacy conferred to them by the national democratic system and each country, through 
the Treaties, is committed to accept decisions taken at EU level. The presumption is that the 
decisions are taken in a collective fashion and all countries are equally affected by them.  
The changes in the new governance system have enlarged the competences of the executive 
powers, conferring upon them the authority to take decisions that might affect specific areas 
of national sovereignty and countries unevenly. While this is justified by the existence of 
specific circumstances, such decisions should be accompanied by the appropriate 
involvement of parliaments (national and European) to better legitimise those decisions or at 
least to improve their accountability.  
The next section makes an assessment of the degree of legitimacy of the policy decisions 
taken (or to be taken) in the framework of the new system of EU governance.  
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Input legitimacy is a non-observable variable, but it can be assessed by examining the 
underlying decision-making processes and, more specifically, the rules and procedures that 
regulate the participation of the different EU and national institutions.  
Similarly, output legitimacy cannot be measured directly. The simplest way to assess it is to 
focus on macro indicators of economic performance that are informative on the ability of 
institutions to deliver results. In the case of the EMU, a more appropriate way to assess 
output legitimacy is to focus on the performance in its specific area of responsibility, namely 
preventing the emergence of negative externalities or mitigating their adverse effects. This is 
indeed the approach followed in the next section. Yet, it should be recognized that because of 
its nature and because the electorate is the ultimate source of legitimacy, in the assessment of 
output legitimacy citizens’ perception matters. When this is taken into account, the degree of 
EMU legitimacy varies widely across countries. In some of the Member States hardest hit by 
the crisis but also in some of those at risk of having to pay the largest share to assist countries 
in difficulty, the perceived output legitimacy of the EMU has declined since the crisis. Box 1 
presents some evidence of this phenomenon on the basis of opinion surveys about citizens’ 
support and confidence in the EU institutions as well as democratic accountability of their 
decisions bodies. Interestingly, the Box also highlights that this trend is also a feature of 
national institutions.   
 
Box 1. Input and output legitimacy: An assessment based on Eurobarometer data 
Assessing legitimacy has always represented a challenge for political scientists, and this task is even 
more challenging in the case of the EU. One of the main problems arises from the difficulty in 
correctly measuring the support that the EU enjoys from its citizens. There are various ways to do 
this, the most common being to examine the results of referenda and the turnout at European 
elections. The latter has often been the subject of discussion, especially recently, as European 
elections have tended to be characterised by a very low turnout compared to national elections.  
Attitudes of European citizens towards Europe can also be ‘measured’ using opinion polls. This is 
certainly not to say that EU democratic legitimacy can be reduced to shifts in opinion about the EU 
as captured in public surveys. Opinion polls, however, do provide an indication of the support and 
approval by citizens of their political institutions and the decisions they take, and this usually 
positively correlates with the consent of citizens, which emerges from elections, and forms the basis 
of democratic legitimacy. 
This box focuses on what can be inferred about legitimacy from opinion polls. In this respect, one of 
the most frequently used indicators of the degree of citizens’ satisfaction with the performance of 
the European Union is a broad public opinion survey conducted two to five times a year across all 
Member States by Eurobarometer, on behalf of the European Commission. Each survey consists of 
approximately 1,000 face-to-face interviews per Member State. Having operated since the 1970s, 
Eurobarometer thus provides comparable data over a long time span. Among the questions of the 
survey, one in particular captures well the concept of input legitimacy: “On the whole, are you very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU?”. 
Looking at changes in the responses to this question over time can help us measure how citizens 
have perceived changes in input legitimacy. The blue bars in the figure below show how the 
percentage of people satisfied have changed between 2010 and 2013 in the different Member States. 
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Figure 1. Input legitimacy: Citizens’ satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU, absolute and 
relative indicators 2010-2013 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurobarometer data, 2010 and 2013. 
This indicator reveals an emerging and increasing dissatisfaction by citizens towards the 
democratic level and quality of the functioning of the EU. This is particularly true for those 
peripheral euro-area countries hardest hit by the sovereign debt crisis, like Portugal (where the 
number of satisfied respondents dropped by 53%), Greece (a reduction of 46%), Spain (43%), 
Cyprus (42%) and Italy (38%). These results seem to suggest a strong lack of input legitimacy in the 
European Union and highlight how the problem has been severely aggravated in recent years. 
However, a closer analysis of the data shows that this interpretation is not necessarily correct, as the 
democratic deficit is not necessarily a specific issue of the European Union.  
An additional question posed in the Eurobarometer survey is the following: “On the whole, are you 
very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your 
country?” It is thus possible to compute the satisfaction with the national and EU democracies and 
see how they have evolved over time and in relative terms. In 2010, on average, the level of 
satisfaction with the way in which democracy worked in the EU was perceived exactly the same as 
at the national level. But in general, citizens of the ‘core’ countries like Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Luxembourg and Finland were relatively less satisfied with the degree of 
democracy at EU level than citizens in peripheral countries.  
The ratio between satisfied with EU and national democracy, suggests that in relative terms the 
level of satisfaction has not severely deteriorated between 2010 and 2013. On the contrary, as shown 
by the orange bars of Figure 1, it has even improved in some peripheral countries like Spain (+25%), 
Cyprus and Italy (+13%) and slightly deteriorated (but not to the levels of the indicator seen 
previously) in Greece (-8%) and Portugal (-9%). This result hides a fall in satisfaction at both level, 
but with a large drop at national level. In other words, dissatisfaction with the actual functioning of 
democracy has increased at both national and EU level and a lower support for political institutions 
is a general trend that is not EU specific. 
Assessing output legitimacy of the euro area through the Eurobarometer data is extremely difficult, 
as this concept depends on the euro area’s performance in meeting the needs and values of citizens, 
which are difficult to define in a standardised way for all the population. Moreover, the 
introduction of the euro has been not only a monetary decision, but also a more powerful and 
broad action. The crisis has shown how EMU membership is not simply a matter of a common 
monetary policy, but a step that influences all aspects of the economic policy of a country. As 
concisely expressed in 1994 by Hans Tietmeyer, the President of the Bundesbank, the euro “will lead 
to member nations transferring their sovereignty over financial and wage policies, losing gradually their 
autonomy over taxation policies”. Therefore, measuring the output legitimacy only on the ability of the 
ECB to achieve the goal of a stable rate of inflation is extremely simplistic.  
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One of the questions asked of respondents by the Eurobarometer that would better capture this 
multi-dimensionality of EMU’s output legitimacy is the following: “Generally speaking, do you think 
that having the euro is a good or a bad thing for your country?” Figure 2 reports the percentage of 
respondents who answered positively in 2010 and 2013 and the change that occurred over time. 
There has been a general reduction in all the euro-area countries, almost 20% on average. 
Interestingly, one of the largest reductions did not occur in a peripheral country like Greece (-12%) 
or Spain (-23%), but rather in Belgium (-40%), which was surpassed only by Cyprus (-58%).  
Figure 2. Output legitimacy: “Having the euro is a good thing for the country”, level of satisfaction and 
change, 2010-2013 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurobarometer data, 2010 and 2013. 
 
 A multi-layered economic governance for EMU: An assessment of the 
legitimacy relationship between Member States and the EU 
The balance of powers, between the EU and its Member States, emerging from the new 
system of governance has raised legitimacy concerns that deserve careful assessment.18 This 
sub-section addresses them by analysing both the democratic aspects of the creation and 
functioning of the new institutional framework (input legitimacy) and, as explained above, 
its ability to protect against externalities (output legitimacy).  
If one were to find a common thread in the institutional changes of the EMU economic 
governance in response to the crisis in the euro area, this would certainly be the attempt to 
strengthen EU supervision on economic matters.  
                                                   
18 In looking at this issue, the literature on European studies usually distinguishes two lines of 
research, one exploring the role of the EU Member States in the institution-building process and 
the other analysing the effect of the evolving EU system of governance on the Member States 
(Marks, Hooghe and Blank, 1996; Cowles, Caporaso and Risse, 2001; Goetz and Hix, 2000). A 
comprehensive understanding of the relationship between the Member States and the European 
Union requires the systematic integration of the two dimensions. For the purposes of this section, 
however, the second dimension will be examined more fully.  
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The various components of the new system of governance described in the previous section 
imply different degrees of EU intrusion in the definition of national economic policies 
according to different situations. Within the European Semester, the Council and the 
European Commission can play a central role in influencing the general principles of fiscal 
policies at national level with the EP or national parliaments playing limited, if any, role. 
This can result in situations where the decisions taken are characterised by a low degree of 
input legitimacy. 
To better understand the different typologies of legitimacy relationships that exist between 
the EU and the Member States, it is helpful to characterize them according to two 
dimensions. The degree of EU constraints faced by national governments when setting 
polices that fall under national sovereignty, as this is informative about input legitimacy, and 
the risk of negative spill-overs, which is related to the degree of output legitimacy.  
As illustrated in Figure 3, we consider four different categories19 (the blue boxes), namely 
macroeconomic adjustment programs, enhanced surveillance of countries under financial 
difficulties, corrective actions for excessive defect and imbalances and coordination and 
surveillance of fiscal and macroeconomic policies. Each of them corresponds to one of the 
procedures foreseen in the new system of governance and to different levels of obligations 
(measured along the vertical axes) Member States are or can be subject to.  
As long as the increased EU executive powers are not accompanied by the corresponding 
mechanisms of political accountability, the stricter the EU interference is, the higher the cost 
in terms of democratic legitimacy.  
The horizontal axes measures the risk that a country falls in a situation of crisis and hence 
that an idiosyncratic shock generates negative spill-overs on other countries or the EMU as 
whole. While this is not a direct proxy for output legitimacy, it is the benchmark against 
which output legitimacy should be assessed. When moving rightwards, the cost of a failure 
in output legitimacy is larger as the risk of large spill-overs is higher. 
The position of the blue boxes in Figure 3 summarizes the result of the exercise; a detailed 
assessment of the different typology of relations is described in the following sub-sections.  
Overall the main finding of the exercise is that EU constraints on national discretion increase 
with the risk of (larger) spill-overs. Put is simply, when such risk increases, the EU intrusion 
increases and input legitimacy weakens (see arrow pointing to the origin of axes).  
The second finding is that a lower input legitimacy is not necessarily offset by higher output 
legitimacy (see arrow with two directions). The idea that a stricter intrusion should lead to 
better capacity to deal with externalities does not seem yet backed by robust evidence. 
                                                   
19 A fifth category including “contractual arrangements”, i.e. countries benefitting from financial 
incentives under the contractual commitment to undertake and complete specific structural 
reforms, could be added. However, given that the conditions triggering the procedure have not yet 
been agreed upon, we are unable to place them in the chart. Indeed, according to the European 
Commission proposal, they could be either voluntary (thus defining a new category) or triggered 
by the macroeconomic imbalances procedure or the excessive imbalance procedure. In the latter 
case, the procedure would not necessarily define a separate category. The taxonomy could be 
further enlarged to also include the peer-review processes defined in the framework of Lisbon 2020 
strategy (e.g. 3% GDP expenditure in R&D). In these cases, the EU may ask Member States for 
greater efforts, but since compliance remains with Member States as the EU has no real powers, 
this case is not included. 
22  ALCIDI, GIOVANNINI & PIEDRAFITA 
 
Figure 3 also helps understanding the limits of the rule-based system and the idea of de-
politicisation of EU decisions presented in the introduction. This exercise suggests that when 
moving away from the axes’ origin, the rule base-system is failing and decisions of political 
nature become inevitable. For those decisions due accountability must be ensured.  
Figure 3. Input and output legitimacy under the new system of governance 
  
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
The rest of the section is devoted to assess the input and output legitimacy issues associated 
with each of the 4 procedure of the new system of governance.  
2.3.1 Implementation of macroeconomic adjustment programmes 
Summary of findings: Decisions are characterised by a lack of transparency, the absence of 
clear lines of responsibility and no political accountability; yet formally input legitimacy 
rests on national parliaments that adopted the measures. De facto the countries under 
adjustment programmes lost part of their sovereignty when they lost their solvency and 
parliaments had no other choice than to accept the measures imposed by the Troika. In 
terms of output legitimacy, the outcome of the programmes has been more or less 
successful depending on the country. At aggregate level, the real economy has recovered 
but remains weak and it is difficult to disentangle how much of the ability to avoid the 
worst-case scenario should be attributed to the programmes and how much to other tools 
like the intervention of the ECB.     
Among the existing procedures included in the exercise, the one associated with the highest 
constraints on national sovereignty and hence the lower degree of discretion in setting 
national policies is the Macroeconomic Adjustment Programme.   
The procedure has been activated in four occasions, namely for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Cyprus. The adjustment programmes have been designed by the Troika of lenders 
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(European Central Bank, European Commission and International Monetary Fund) and, as 
illustrated in Figure 4, since May 2010 implied the disbursement of around €400 billion. 
Figure 4. Macro-financial assistance to euro-area Member States 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on official European Commission documents (May 2014).  
The democratic legitimacy of this procedure has been the object of a large debate within the 
institutions, in particular the EP, and the outcome of the Greek programme will make the 
object of an assessment of the European Court of Auditors. 
Input legitimacy 
When the Troika was set up for the first time in 2010, the intent was to create an informal 
body to deal with the design of an adjustment programme20 for Greece and manage the 
disbursement of funds having different sources (bilateral loans, EU budget guarantees, and 
IMF funds). However, as the need for financial assistance moved from Greece to other 
countries, the visibility and the role of the Troika increased massively in the European 
panorama to become almost like a new institution. This happened despite the lack of a well-
defined mandate and a system of transparent and democratic oversight. The Troika was not 
obliged to report to the EP about how and why decisions were taken.  
In each of the four countries that have been assisted by the Troika, national governments and 
parliaments have accepted the conditions imposed by the lenders in the Memorandum of 
Understanding in exchange for financial support. Stricto sensu, national authorities carry the 
responsibility for the policies chosen and voted. Yet, de facto, given the emergency situations 
there is little doubt that national governments and parliaments had little choice but to accept 
the conditions imposed. In these cases, Member State had little discretion even on how to 
comply with certain objectives, as specific implementing measures were often dictated 
(‘Obligation of means’). In practice, the costs associated with rejecting the conditions 
attached to the financial assistance were estimated as being too high relative to their, de 
facto, low degree of democratic legitimacy. 
                                                   
20 Two key reasons for the creation of a body with three heads (EC, IMF and ECB) stem from a) the 
inexperience of the European Commission to design and deal with adjustment programmes, in 
contrast with the long standing experience of the IMF, and b) the fact that the ECB was strongly 
supporting the banking systems in the most stressed countries and de facto being the only 
institution that could potentially commit unlimited amounts of resources, if necessary. 
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In 2013, European legislation has evolved to provide better regulation of the conditions 
applied to countries under macroeconomic adjustment programme. Regulation 472/2013 on 
the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area 
experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability 
(two-pack) establishes how the adjustment programmes should be prepared and adopted, 
the role of the Commission to monitor its implementation and the capacity of the Council to 
interrupt disbursements of the financial assistance of the EFSF/ESM in case of non-
compliance. These legislative developments have certainly represented a step forward in the 
clearer definition and better recognition of the powers of the European institutions, helping 
to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the decisions of the Troika. However, as the enquiry 
report on the role and operations of the Troika (European Parliament, 2014) testifies, several 
points still remain open.  
Output legitimacy 
Has the low level of input legitimacy been compensated or supplemented by a high degree 
of output legitimacy? 
Considering the results delivered by the countries under macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes, two of the four programmes – Portugal and Ireland – can be considered a 
success in the sense that the initial expectations in terms of adjustment, both fiscal and 
external, were broadly fulfilled (Gros et al., 2014). The ‘clean exit’ from the bailout and the 
return to financial markets without resorting to a credit line represent a confirmation that 
these programmes have worked well, at least in the assessment of the markets.21 
By contrast, Greece stands out as a negative exception. The macroeconomic adjustment that 
the country had to undergo has been accompanied by a deep and long recession and series 
of downward revisions of growth projections. This has put a strain on the whole economic 
and social system of the country.  
The reasons for the failure should be sought both in the deficiency of the initial plans and in 
the unsatisfactory implementation of it (see Gros et al., 2014). In the first programme fiscal 
targets were repeatedly missed, resulting in a serious underestimation of the output losses. 
Only with the following programmes, the situation has been partially improving over time 
and the fiscal adjustment is now almost completed. By contrast, the external adjustment has 
not proceeded well in terms of export recovery and the country has been unable to offset the 
negative impact of the fiscal adjustment on demand. Exports have been at best stagnating 
despite the significant fall in wage costs. The resistance to structural reforms has been 
striking and almost no progress has been made in improving the quality of the 
administration and governance of the country.22  
The experience of Cyprus is more difficult to assess because the programme started later and 
the problems of the country are very specific and strictly linked to the structure of its 
financial sector. 
At aggregate level, it is still too early to find robust evidence that the programmes have 
increased the long-term growth potential by structurally increasing the competitiveness of 
these countries and the efficiency of their economies.  
                                                   
21 See also De Souza et al. (2014). 
22 See Böwer et al. (2014). 
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Overall whether the programmes have ‘protected’ the EMU from negative externalities 
remain unclear. On the one hand, the crisis started in Greece and then spread also to other 
countries suggesting, from the governance system perspective, a failure of the programme 
and hence low output legitimacy. On the other hand, it is also true that financial turbulences 
stopped when the Irish and Portuguese programmes started to deliver good results, even if it 
is difficult to disentangle how much of the ability to avoid the worst-case scenario should be 
attributed to the programmes and how much to other tools like the intervention of the ECB. 
2.3.2 Enhanced budgetary surveillance 
Summary of findings: The Commission plays a prominent role by deciding on the 
activation of the procedure, stipulating the measures that the country must adopt and 
monitoring and assessing the implementation. Although the Commission is accountable to 
the EP, in practice specific decisions taken under these circumstances are accompanied by 
only a little degree of accountability. Since the procedure was never used, it cannot be said 
whether an increased output legitimacy could compensate for low input legitimacy. It 
should be recognized, however, that the idea behind its design is to prevent crisis from 
spilling from one country across the rest of the Union   
Under Regulation 472/2013 included in the two-pack, the European Commission might 
(unilaterally) make a euro area Member State subject to enhanced surveillance when it is 
facing or experiencing severe difficulties with regard to financial stability but no financial 
support is being provided. Euro area Member States receiving precautionary financial 
assistance from the ESM are automatically placed under the enhanced surveillance 
procedure. 
Input legitimacy 
In order to activate the regular enhanced surveillance, the Commission needs first to provide 
an assessment whether the euro area Member State is experiencing or threatened with 
serious difficulties with regard to its financial stability that are likely to have adverse spill-
over effects on other euro area Member States. If this condition is fulfilled, the Commission 
may unilaterally decide to subject the Member State to regular enhanced surveillance in 
accordance with Art. 2.1 of the new regulation.  
A number of parameters are to be considered when conducting this comprehensive 
assessment.23 If a Member State is receiving financial assistance on a precautionary basis, i.e. 
Precautionary Conditioned Credit Line (PCCL) or Enhanced Conditions Credit Line (ECCL), 
the enhanced surveillance procedure is launched automatically as soon as the credit line is 
drawn.24 
A Member State under enhanced surveillance has to take measures to address the sources of 
the difficulties and other measures requested by the Commission in order to implement the 
                                                   
23 In particular, the legislation requires the Commission explicitly to take a number of parameters 
into account: i) the alert mechanism report, ii) the latest in-depth review, where available, iii) the 
borrowing conditions of the Member State, iv) the repayment profile of its debt obligations, v) the 
robustness of its budgetary framework, vi) the long term sustainability of its public finances, vii) 
the importance of the debt burden and ix) the risk of contagion from severe tensions in the 
financial sector on its fiscal situation or on the financial sector from other Member States. 
24 See European Commission (2013). 
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enhanced surveillance. Regular review missions are conducted by the Commission in liaison 
with the ECB and with the relevant European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and, where 
appropriate, the IMF, to verify progress in the implementation by the Member State. The 
Commission has to report to the Economic and Financial Committee of the Council and the 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the EP on the findings of these missions. If 
further measures are considered as needed, it might recommend the Council to ask the 
concerned Member State to adopt precautionary corrective measures or prepare a draft 
macroeconomic adjustment programme.  
While the activation of the procedure should be based on indicators allowing the 
Commission to take a decision as objective (and hence less political) as possible, in practice 
this will only be possible to a limited extent. And the policy measures requested by the 
Commission will inevitably affect the setting of national economic policy and hence the 
legitimacy of the decisions, given that in practice the EP will have only a limited role in the 
assessment of the implementation. 
Output legitimacy 
To date, no country has requested the activation of precautionary financial assistance from 
the ESM and no country has been placed under enhanced surveillance by the Commission. 
Hence the assessment of output legitimacy can only relay on predictions of theory. This 
makes it difficult to assess the actual ability of this instrument in preventing crisis situations.  
More in general the fact that both Ireland and Portugal have exited their adjustment 
programmes without a precautionary credit line could even raise questions about the use 
and the effectiveness of this financial instrument.  
2.3.3 Corrective actions for excessive deficits and imbalances 
Summary of findings: The decision to activate the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) is 
almost automatic, the excessive imbalance procedure (EIP) is less so. In the first phase of 
the procedures, countries are free to choose the policies they deem appropriate to achieve 
certain objectives. Under the monitoring of the Commission, however, in the enforcement 
phase, if it occurs, the Commission alone plays a key role, while the Council can only block 
the Commission’s actions. In terms of output legitimacy, doubt exists on the ability of such 
procedures to prevent negative externalities given potential enforcement problems for the 
EDP and the weaknesses of some indicators (of the MIP scoreboard) potentially relevant 
for the activation of the EIP. 
A third category includes countries under the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) or the 
macroeconomic imbalance procedure (MIP), as defined by SGP and the six- and two- packs. 
Under this situation, countries are free to choose the policies that are deemed to be more 
appropriate to meet certain objectives (obligation of results) defined by the European 
Commission, possibly following the recommendations issued by the Council as indicated by 
the European Commission.  
Input legitimacy 
In this context, the six-pack established financial penalties for breaching either the deficit or 
debt limit, and also a reverse qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council for adopting 
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some sanctions.25 Regulation 473/2013 (two-pack) established the obligation of countries 
under EDP to inform the Commission and the Council about relevant fiscal policy decisions 
before they are submitted to the national parliaments, in any case every 6 or 3 months, 
according to the stage of the procedure. Moreover, the two-pack also requires euro-area 
Member States entering EDP to design an Economic Partnership Programmes (EPPs) and 
define a precise roadmap for structural reforms, considered instrumental to an effective and 
lasting correction of the excessive deficit.  
If a euro-area Member State is found to experience an excessive imbalance in the sense of the 
MIP regulation, an excessive imbalance procedure (EIP) may be opened by the Commission 
and the Council. According to the procedure, the Member State is obliged to define a clear 
roadmap and set deadlines for implementing corrective actions to absorb the imbalance. 
During this phase, the concerned Member State should regularly report to the Commission 
on progress to assure an adequate monitoring of the adopted policies. If the euro-area 
Member State fails to submit an adequate corrective action plan or fails to enforce the agreed 
corrective actions, the Council, under the reverse QMV rule, could impose sanctions 
following a two-step approach. First, an interest-bearing deposit can be imposed in the case 
of one compliance failure; after a second failure, this interest-bearing deposit can be 
converted into a fine (up to 0.1% of GDP).  
Output legitimacy 
In order to assess the output legitimacy of the excessive deficit procedure and excessive 
imbalance procedure, it is first necessary to evaluate whether the parameters that define the 
absence/presence of imbalances are indeed appropriate as early warning indicators and well 
designed to identify situations of real risk. 
In this respect, two major issues emerge, one for each procedure. The first one relates to the 
fact that some key targets in the framework of the EDP are set for unobservable variables. 
The second one relates to the very definition of the indicators used in the MIP scoreboard to 
identify emerging or persistent macroeconomic imbalances. 
Regarding the first issue, in the new provisions of the SGP as well as in the Fiscal Compact, 
the output gap and the potential growth rate are crucial parameters in the establishment of 
countries’ fiscal objectives as well as for compliance with rules written in the national 
constitution. Indeed the definition of the medium-term objectives (MTOs) requires the 
computation of the government balance in structural terms (i.e. cyclically-adjusted and net of 
one-off measures), like the rule of the balanced budget imposed by the Fiscal Compact. 
While this approach makes sense from an economic point of view, given that assessing fiscal 
sustainability using nominal targets can be misleading, at the same time that it creates 
important uncertainties in terms of measurement (as the structural government balance is 
not an observable variable) and, therefore, definition of appropriate fiscal policies at national 
level.  
In practice the calculation of the structural deficit requires the identification and estimation 
of some key parameter which can lead to very different outcomes. The commonly used 
methodology assures that calculating the output gaps and potential output does not result in 
bias in favour of any Member State, but the same methodology does not necessarily assure 
                                                   
25 The Fiscal Compact establishes a stricter limit for the structural deficit in the euro-area Member 
States, including the obligation to enshrine the balanced budget and debt-brake rules in their 
constitutional or similar legal orders and extends the use of the reverse QMV in most sanctions. 
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that structural deficit indicators are an effective tool in guiding policy decisions. Alcidi and 
Gros (2014a) point to the high real-time volatility in the estimates of the output gap and 
structural deficit figures leading to high uncertainty in the ex-ante formulation of policies in 
order to keep the budget below the 0.5% threshold as foreseen by the Fiscal Compact. In 
practice, another degree of uncertainty is introduced by the fact that the structural balance 
has to be estimated ex-ante for the formulation of appropriate policies. This implies that the 
uncertainty associated with the measurement of the structural component of GDP is 
combined with the uncertainty of the future, i.e. forecasts about future GDP and budgetary 
items. Of course, the two errors could either offset or magnify each other. Figure 5 shows, for 
example, the case of Italy and how estimates of the structural balance are almost always 
subject to corrections over time, which can be quite large – sometimes equal to as much as a 2 
percentage point difference from one year to another. Budgets submitted in the spring are 
almost systematically over-optimistic (as shown by the orange bars). This would imply that 
pressure at EU level on national fiscal policies may exist when not necessary and, vice versa, 
the system may remain silent when risks are emerging.  
Figure 5. Italy: Structural balance as % of GDP, real time data with revision for yearly values of the 
time series 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on European Commission data. 
As regard the second issue, the indicators in the MIP scoreboard (as presented in an annual 
Alert Mechanism Report (AMR) and the ‘in-depth review’ (IDR)) should be able to correctly 
identify the build-up of stock imbalances that might precipitate a crisis.  
However, the design of some of the indicators in the MIP-scoreboard26 could imply that the 
indicators are unable to differentiate between imbalances that could pose a ‘serious risk’ 
from those that do not (Gros and Giovannini, 2014). Thus, policy-makers are not provided 
with solid bases to take effective corrections.  
This is the case, for instance, with scoreboard indicators relating to external imbalances and 
competitiveness.  
                                                   
26 It should be noticed that the scoreboard is only one element of the assessment for the EIP, but it is 
supposed to be the most objective. 
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As shown in Figure 6 (in the first row), the indicator on the evolution of export market shares 
signals that only three of (shown) 17 euro-area Member States did not exceed the limit 
defined by the scoreboard (decline in export market shares by more than 6%). But if the same 
‘alarm’ rings for all countries, it may be difficult to understand which countries are 
experiencing a macroeconomic imbalance or are exposed to that risk.  Furthermore, in the 
absence of the (bilateral) exchange rate channel to correct external imbalances, the 
competitiveness indicators should especially highlight deteriorating external imbalances 
relative to other countries so as to suggest policy action. However, should most of the 
Member States experience a similar trend, the effective exchange rate of the euro would 
react, limiting the need for structural adjustments at the level of individual Member States. 
In this perspective, looking at the performance of relative rather than absolute indicators 
thereby considering as excesses only imbalances that deviate from the euro-area average 
could ensure a better monitoring and assessment of the functioning of EMU (Gros and 
Giovannini, 2014). The second row in  Figure 6 shows how the use of a relative measure for 
the market share indicator reduces the number of ‘alerts’ singled out by the scoreboard, thus 
helping to better identify those countries that have a greater (and riskier) imbalance. 
Figure 6. Export market share indicator: absolute vs. relative (to euro area average) scoreboard (2013) 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data. 
2.3.4 Coordination and surveillance of fiscal and macroeconomic policies 
Summary of findings: Input legitimacy rests largely with national governments. The 
Commission and the Council (and only to a limited extent the EP) have an important role 
in the formulation of the country-specific recommendations, but experience suggests that 
they are only partially taken into account by national governments. The steps foreseen in 
the framework of the coordination process remain of key importance to ensure 
transparency of and commitment to certain policies by national governments. In terms of 
output legitimacy of EMU, coordination is the fundamental answer in order to avoid the 
emergence of negative externalities, which we interpret here by the idea that Member 
States with sound policies contribute to an EMU that is able to deliver good outcomes.   
Input legitimacy 
EU Member States have to submit their stability or convergence programmes (outlining their 
medium-term budgetary strategies) as well as their national reform programmes (outlining 
specific structural reforms to promote growth and competitiveness) to the Commission in 
mid-April following the European Council’s policy orientations based on the AGS and, 
where appropriate, taking into account the Commission’s recommendations following the 
in-depth reviews of macroeconomic imbalances. The Commission evaluates the national 
plans and presents draft country-specific recommendations, which are then discussed and 
adopted by the Council – once they have been endorsed by the European Council. The 
Council has to justify any changes to the Commission’s proposal. Regulation 473/2013 of the 
two-pack established the obligation of the euro-area Member States to submit their draft 
annual budgetary plans before mid-October to the Commission in order to check, and the 
30  ALCIDI, GIOVANNINI & PIEDRAFITA 
 
Eurogroup to discuss, whether they are in line with the recommendations of the European 
Semester.  
If the Commission identifies particularly serious non-compliance with the budgetary policy 
obligations, the Commission might ask the concerned Member State to present a revised 
draft. Before the end of November, the Commission has to publish its final opinion on the 
draft budgetary plans for discussion in the Eurogroup.27 
All these steps were undertaken as the sovereign debt crisis has clearly shown the 
ineffectiveness of control mechanisms and sanctions of the SGP. On the one hand, the case of 
Greece revealed how the quality of the information provided by the states was often 
inaccurate or reductive. On the other hand, the procedures to sanction ex-post have never 
produced the enforcement necessary to ensure that the SGP rules were truly respected and 
could act as a constitutional constraint on the states.  
Output legitimacy 
The problems related to the lack of effectiveness of an EU rule-based system which have to 
co-exist with national sovereignty are well known and widely documented. The measures 
contained in the six-pack and in the two-pack have been designed to effectively solve some 
of these problems and thus increase the output legitimacy. However, significant issues 
remain.  
In the framework of the European Semester country-specific recommendations endorsed by 
the European Council at the end of the Semester cycle in early July represent a crucial EU 
output for policy coordination. They are formulated on the basis of specific challenges 
previously identified by the Commission and they are intended to provide policy 
prescriptions to Member States and concrete and measurable policy objectives that should be 
assessed ex-post by the Commission. Nonetheless countries tend either to circumvent or just 
disregard them.  
Country-specific recommendations could be divided into two broad classes. Policy 
recommendations regarding fiscal policy are usually precise and refer to specific numerical 
targets. In this case it is more difficult for the country to avoid compliance, despite economic 
circumstances are often advocated for benefiting of delays. By contrast, policy 
recommendations on structural reforms aiming at the promotion of growth and 
competitiveness, financial stability or the improvement of the judicial system are usually 
very broad and quite vague. While this is unavoidable, as specific numerical targets cannot 
be applied in all contexts, the assessment of compliance becomes very difficult. In some 
cases, the vagueness of the country-specific recommendations, results in a poor delivery of 
the requested policies (this is especially true for some parts of structural reforms).28 
                                                   
27 Among others, the draft budgetary plan must contain the following information: i) The targeted 
budget balance for the general government as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), 
broken down by subsector of general government; ii) The projections, assuming no change in 
current policies, for expenditure and revenue as a percentage of GDP for the general government 
and their main components, including gross fixed capital formation; iii) The targeted expenditure 
and revenue as a percentage of GDP for the general government and their main components; and 
iv) Relevant information on the general government expenditure by function, including on 
education, healthcare and employment, and, where possible, indications on the expected 
distributional impact of the main expenditure and revenue measures. 
28 Alcidi and Gros (2014b) provide two, admittedly extreme, examples of the ambiguity of these 
recommendations. The first one is the recommendation to “further stimulate competition” in the 
 
ENHANCING THE LEGITIMACY OF EMU GOVERNANCE | 31 
 
In general terms, it is hard to describe the overall progress made with the implementation of 
the country-specific recommendations as a success, especially for particular policy domains. 
According to recent analysis (Clayes et al., 2013), only 16% of the recommendations issued in 
the social domain were actually implemented by the Member States, while 44% were just 
‘promised’ in the National Reforms Plans. Also in the domain of internal market policy, the 
number of recommendations actually implemented by Member States is only 28% of the total 
(Figure 7). By contrast, measures on financial markets and the environment have shown a 
higher degree of implementation.  
In this framework, the assessment of output legitimacy is very difficult. The one message 
that emerges is that countries seem unable to see the benefit of policy coordination and tend 
to make efforts in bypassing country-specific recommendations rather than to comply with 
them. 
Figure 7. Index of implementation of country-specific recommendations by domain 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on Clayes et al. (2013) data. 
                                                                                                                                                               
German services sector contained in the 2012 country-specific recommendations. The German 
government responded to this request by adopting measures on....chimney sweeping! The second 
case refers to Italy, where the 2013 country-specific recommendations invited the country to “shift 
the tax burden away from capital and labour towards property”. In 2013 the government 
proceeded to abolish the real estate tax (IMU) introduced by the Monti government in 2012. A 
somewhat similar real estate tax was then introduced again for 2014. 
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3. Enhancing input legitimacy: the role of the European Parliament 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Strong executive powers have been conferred to the EU institutions, thereby creating 
gaps in terms of political accountability that can only be solved at EU level. It is, 
therefore, essential to strengthen the involvement of the EP in EMU governance. 
 In the European Semester, there is room to improve the contribution of the EP in 
establishing the EU’s economic priorities and the parliamentary oversight of the 
country-specific recommendations and their implementation by Member States. 
 The ‘troika’ model should be adapted to the new provisions in the six- and the two-
packs. The Commission can provide an evaluation of its participation and 
recommendations. The involvement and responsibilities of the Eurogroup and the ECB 
should be spelled out more clearly.  
 The EP could be authorised to set the budget appropriations of the Convergence and 
Competitiveness Instrument, and the financial facility could be adopted through EU 
legislation.  
 Parliamentary oversight of the European Council and the Eurogroup could be 
improved through better use of the economic dialogues with their Presidents on EMU 
decisions and policy actions.  
 An exchange of views with the President of the Eurogroup and the Managing Director 
of the ESM could contribute to improving the political accountability of this body.  
 The agreed mechanisms for the oversight of the ECB’s supervisory powers and the 
Resolution Board should be used to their full potential.  
 The creation of a subcommittee of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for 
the scrutiny of EMU would facilitate the exercise of all these tasks by the EP. It would 
also allow for a more effective format of inter-parliamentary cooperation with (and 
among) the national parliaments of the euro area.  
 The selection of the President of the Commission through the EP elections could 
contribute to increasing the political capital of the EP, citizens’ interest in the elections 
and their support for the EU, but there are still many hurdles that need to be overcome 
before these objectives can be achieved.  
The previous chapter identified the main shortcomings in terms of input legitimacy of the 
current governance framework. Stronger implementing and supervisory powers have been 
transferred to the EU level but political accountability and parliamentary oversight is not 
fully ensured. Although the two-pack was meant to improve the regulation and 
accountability of the Troika, the role of its different members and the lines of responsibility 
are not yet clearly defined. Nevertheless, the government of the country concerned has little 
choice but to accept the Memorandum of Understanding with important ‘obligations of means’ 
for state spending and tax policies. The enhanced budgetary surveillance by the 
Commission, the Economic Partnership Programmes (EPPs) and the supervision of national 
macroeconomic imbalances also pose some concerns in terms of input legitimacy. Unlike 
national governments, the Commission does not respond to citizens for its actions in general 
elections and therefore parliamentary oversight becomes crucial. Although the obligations of 
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the euro-area countries in the case of coordination and surveillance of fiscal and 
macroeconomic policies are less significant and more difficult to enforce, the adoption of 
country-specific recommendations in the framework of the European Semester and the ex-
ante control of the draft budgets in October by the Commission and the Eurogroup also 
require proper parliamentary scrutiny both at EU and national level.    
After looking into the reasons that justify the involvement of the EP in the governance of 
EMU, this section reviews the role of the EP in the development and implementation of the 
new regulatory framework and outlines how it could be strengthened in order to increase 
the input legitimacy. It then examines specific proposals to modify the organisational 
structures of the EP so as to improve the parliamentary oversight of the euro-area 
governance and ways to enhance the cooperation between the EP and the national 
parliaments. The last section looks into the benefits that increased political conflict in the EP 
could bring in terms of input legitimacy. 
 The input legitimacy of EMU and the EP   
The involvement of the EP is essential to the input legitimacy of EMU governance and can be 
justified on several grounds. Even if many matters of economic governance fall within the 
category of ‘coordination competences’ (Art. 5 and from 120 to 126 TFEU), key measures in 
the realm of monetary and financial policy aim to preserve the stability of the euro, which is 
an exclusive competence of the EU (Art. 3 TFEU). The EP is also – together with the Council 
– the budgetary authority of the EU and the EU budget is highly dependent on national 
budgets and contributions.29 Compared to national governments and parliaments, which are 
more prone to represent the national interests, the EP is in a better position to promote the 
EU’s common good and ensure that the strong interdependence between EU economies is 
fully taken into account. Its participation has also proved essential to ensure the protection of 
the rights of non-participating Member States in the light of increasing differentiated 
integration. Moreover, the management of the euro crisis increased confrontation between 
debtor and creditor countries, adding up to the traditional divisions between small and large 
Member States and different geographical regions. The EP could contribute to building up 
solidarity and trust among Member States and their citizens, which is essential for the 
effectiveness and sustainability of the governance of the euro area in the future. Otherwise, 
citizens might fail to understand certain decisions and regard them as imposed by ‘the 
others’, which would undermine their credibility and efficacy.   
EU decisions and policies have a strong impact on national spending and tax policies, which 
lie at the heart of national sovereignty and national parliaments’ powers. It is therefore 
crucial to engage national parliaments in the process through strengthened inter-
parliamentary cooperation and to adopt measures to ensure the accountability of their 
respective governments. The EP, however, should be responsible for ensuring that EU 
institutions and policy-makers are held accountable for their actions. New implementing and 
supervisory powers have been conferred to the European Commission and the European 
Central Bank (ECB). The European Council, the Council and the Eurogroup have played a 
crucial role in the development of the new regulatory framework and are key players when 
it comes to its implementation.  
The Commission, the President of the European Council and the President of the Eurogroup 
(especially if it becomes a full-time position) are not – and cannot be – accountable to specific 
national parliaments or citizens, but rather to the EP, representing all the European citizens, 
                                                   
29 See Fasone (2012). 
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and being directly elected by them. Decisions taken by the European Council and the 
Council do not necessarily require unanimity and might affect Member States unevenly. The 
same applies for the Eurogroup. A decision might severely affect a Member State with a very 
limited power on its adoption. The electorate of that country has therefore no capacity to 
hold those responsible for the decision accountable. In these circumstances it is essential to 
ensure the effective parliamentary oversight of these decisions at the EU level. Equally, the 
new powers of the ECB that go beyond its exclusive autonomous competences in monetary 
policy must be held accountable at the EU level. Only in this way can the democratic 
principles of representation and checks-and-balances, which are key to the concept of input 
legitimacy in the EU, be ensured.  
Figure 8. Inequality* in terms of population in the EP 
 
* Inequality is measured as the ratio between the population of each country divided by its number of seats and 
the total population divided by the total number of MEPs (751). 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
The representativeness of the EP has elsewhere been contested on grounds that the larger 
Member States are underrepresented and the smaller Member States are largely 
overrepresented. Compared to lower chambers representing citizens (not states) in national 
states, indeed, the EP shows a substantive departure from the principle ‘one person, one 
vote’, which would be achieved by allocating the seats in strict accordance with the total 
population of each Member State, as shown in Figure 8. 
ENHANCING THE LEGITIMACY OF EMU GOVERNANCE | 35 
 
Figure 9 shows how the four larger Member States, which represent over 53% of the EU 
population, elect only 42% of the 751 MEPs, whereas the MEPs elected in the 14 smallest 
countries represent almost 20% of all MEPs, which is double their population share. 
Figure 9. Share in the overall population and total MEPs: Large vs. small Member States 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
In federal states with two chambers, however, representation in the upper chamber responds 
to the principle ‘one state, one vote’, whereas in the Council of the EU the larger Member 
States are overrepresented in the current allocation of votes for qualified majority voting.  
Figure 10. Share in the Council votes and total number of Member States: Large vs. small Member 
States (%) 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
In a hypothetical ‘Senate’ made up of the same number of representatives for each Member 
State, the 14 smallest countries – representing one-half of the total Member States – would 
have 50% of the votes. But in the Council these countries account for 24% of all votes (under 
the voting weights currently in force), that is about one-half of the weight they would have 
under the principle of equality among states. Conversely, the four largest Member States 
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would have 14% of the Council votes under the principle ‘one state, one vote’ (Figure 10), 
but in reality they have one-third (more than double).30 
 The EP in the development of the new EMU  
As described in the previous chapter the development of the new governance of EMU has on 
occasion taken the form of inter-governmental agreements outside the EU’s legal framework, 
whereas in other instances it has proceeded by means of EU secondary legislation under 
ordinary or special legislative procedures.31 In the first case, the involvement of the EP in the 
negotiations was much more limited. In the second case, the EP either had co-decision 
powers or was consulted on decisions ultimately to be taken by the Council. On certain 
occasions, the EP used its co-decision powers in a file to influence an intergovernmental 
agreement or a consultation procedure. This section will examine the role played by the EP 
in shaping the new economic governance and the position envisaged for this institution in 
the application of the new regulatory framework. 
During the negotiations of the so-called ‘six-pack’, the EP could exert its leverage because 
four of the regulations were under the OLP (Ordinary Legislative Procedure), in which the 
EP and the Council have co-legislative powers. The EP secured the introduction of the so-
called ‘economic dialogues’; the automatic application of a Commission’s warning to a 
specific country unless a qualified majority of the euro-area governments rejects the warning 
(in which case they have to explain their decision to the EP); the establishment of a legal 
basis for the European Semester (See Article 2a Regulation 1175/2011); the right to invite 
finance ministers from countries that have received a warning to a hearing; the obligation of 
the Commission to scrutinise – when investigating the sources of macroeconomic instability 
– not only countries with a trade deficit but also those running current account surpluses; the 
introduction of principles on statistical independence (Article 10a Regulation 1175/2011) and 
sanctions (Article 8 Regulation 1173/2011) for providing misleading statistics; and the 
agreement by the Commission to prepare a report on “euro/stability bonds”.  
The ability of the EP to influence the negotiations of the ‘two-pack’ was even higher because 
both regulations were under the OLP and there was closer cooperation between the two 
largest groups in EP. On this occasion, the EP ensured a stronger focus on growth, a higher 
concern for education and healthcare in the Commission’s assessments and a better oversight 
of the Commission’s increased powers. For instance, the Commission’s powers to impose 
extra reporting requirements on Member States’ governments must be renewed every three 
years and can be revoked by the EP and the Council. In relation to the countries under 
enhanced and post-programme surveillance, the Commission must communicate its 
assessment to the EP Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, and orally inform its Chair 
and Vice-Chairs of the progress made in preparation and monitoring of countries under 
adjustment programmes. The EP may invite the Commission and the Member State 
concerned to participate in an exchange of views on the recommendation to adopt a 
precautionary or macroeconomic programme and on the progress made in the 
                                                   
30 As from 1 November 2014, Art. 16 TEU provides that a qualified majority will be defined as at least 
55 % of the members of the Council (16 countries in EU-28) comprising at least 65 % of the 
population of the EU. Population will therefore continue being an important factor in the Council 
and larger Member States will still be essential to winning coalitions. 
31 In the ordinary legislative procedures (OLPs), the EP and the Council are on an equal footing. In 
most (but not all) special legislative procedures, the EP is consulted or has to give its consent to the 
legislative act adopted by the Council.  
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implementation of the adjustment programme. Finally, during the negotiations the EP also 
secured an agreement on the provision of an instrument to mobilise 1% of the GDP to 
promote growth and the preparation of a roadmap for the implementation of a debt 
redemption pact. 
In the case of the Capital Requirements Directive IV, the EP used its co-decision powers to 
tighten the liquidity requirements, to increase the cap on management remuneration and to 
establish a more transparent method of reporting tax payments. The approval of Regulation 
1024/2013, conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning policies relating to the prudential 
supervision of credit institutions, only required the EP to be consulted, but the EP used its 
co-decision powers in the negotiations of the related Regulation 1022/2013 amending the 
European Supervisory Authority to force an inter-institutional agreement with the ECB on 
the oversight of these supervisory tasks.  
The involvement of the EP in the negotiations of the three intergovernmental treaties agreed 
so far by Member States outside the EU legal framework has varied widely from one to 
another. It was not involved at all in negotiating the Treaty establishing the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM), whereas it participated in the negotiations of the Treaty on the 
Stability, Coordination and Governance of EMU (TSCG) and played a key role in the case of 
the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The EP’s leverage and participation were in part 
determined by the legal basis inspiring each of the treaties. 
On 16 December 2010, the European Council agreed to add the following text in Art. 136 
TFEU: 
The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism 
to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. 
The granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made 
subject to strict conditionality.  
In March 2011, the EP approved the treaty amendment after receiving assurances that the 
European Commission would play a central role in running the ESM and that the 
intergovernmental mechanism would be eventually brought within the EU framework. On 
the basis of the new treaty amendment, the (then) 17 Member States of the euro area signed 
the Treaty establishing the ESM on 2 February 2012. As from October 2013, the ESM issues 
debt instruments in order to finance loans and other forms of financial assistance to euro-
area Member States. The direct recapitalisation of banks is possible under certain 
circumstances. The ESM Board of Governors consists of the Ministers for Finance of the euro-
area Member States and is chaired by the President of the Eurogroup. The Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and the President of the ECB participate in the meetings as 
observers. The Commission in liaison with the ECB, and wherever possible, together with 
the IMF, are responsible for negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding with the Member 
State concerned, detailing the conditionality attached to the financial assistance facility and 
for monitoring its compliance. The EP was not involved in the negotiations and the treaty 
establishing the ESM does not make any reference to this institution.  
Despite the fact that many provisions in the TSCG could have been regulated by EU 
legislative acts on the basis of Arts 121, 126 and 136 TFEU, the EP eventually accepted the 
inter-governmental negotiations and sent three representatives to the talks. The involvement 
of the EP was essential to bring the agreement in line with the six-pack, ensure its 
implementation through secondary legislation and secure the commitment to incorporate it 
into the EU legal framework within five years. In the negotiations, the EP also advocated the 
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rights of the non-euro-area Member States and promoted their participation in some 
discussions of the Euro Summit meetings.32 Finally, Art. 13 of the TSCG provided for the 
creation of an inter-parliamentary conference with representatives from the EP and the 
parliaments of the Member States signing the agreement to discuss the budgetary policies 
and other issues covered by this treaty.  
The decision of the Ecofin Council on 18 December 2013 to resort to an inter-governmental 
treaty for some aspects of the resolution fund – taking them out of the Commission’s original 
proposal under the ordinary legislative procedure – was strongly criticised by the EP. 
Nevertheless, the EP used its leverage in the negotiations with the Council on the SRM 
regulation to influence the inter-governmental agreement. As promoted by the EP, the 
decision-making of the Resolution Board was simplified, the mutualisation of the resources 
was speeded up and a credit line for the fund, which so-called ‘pre-in’ EMU members could 
use as well, was included. Also, the involvement of the EP was essential to make the 
Resolution Board accountable not only to the Council and the Commission, but also to the 
EP, having the obligation to keep all three institutions informed of its activities on a regular 
basis and to participate in hearings with the EP.  
 The EP in the implementation of the new regulatory framework 
As explained in the first section of this chapter, the contribution of the EP is essential to 
improve the input legitimacy of the governance of EMU.  This section looks into how the role 
of the EP could be strengthened in three particular areas: 1) its participation in the European 
Semester; 2) the parliamentary oversight of the macroeconomic adjustment programmes, 
and, eventually, the enhanced budgetary surveillance and the competitiveness and 
convergence instrument; and 3) the assurance of the political accountability of the European 
Council, the Eurogroup and the ECB.  
3.3.1 EP’s participation in the European Semester 
The competent EP committee may invite the President of the Council, the Commission, as 
well as the President of the European Council and the President of the Eurogroup where 
appropriate, for an economic dialogue to discuss a number of issues related to the six pack, 
namely: 
1. Information provided by the Council on the broad guidelines of economic policy (Art. 
121.2 TFEU) and general guidance to Member States issued by the Commission at the 
beginning of the annual cycle of surveillance. Conclusions drawn by the European 
Council on orientations for economic policies in the context of the European Semester.33 
2. The results of the multilateral surveillance and the conclusions drawn by the European 
Council on the orientation and results of multilateral surveillance. The review of the 
conduct of multilateral surveillance at the end of the European Semester.34 
3. Council recommendations addressed to Member States in accordance with Art. 121(4) 
TFEU when there is a significant deviation. As a rule, the Council is expected to follow 
the recommendations and proposals of the Commission or explain its position publicly. 
                                                   
32 Namely, in those meetings concerning competitiveness, the modification of the global architecture 
of the euro area and the fundamental rules that will apply to it in the future, as well as, when 
appropriate and at least once a year, in discussions on the implementation of the TSCG. 
33 Regulation 1466/97 as amended by Regulation 1175/2011, and Regulation 1176/2011. 
34 Regulation 1466/97 as amended by Regulation 1175/2011, and Regulation 1176/2011. 
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The report made by the Council to the European Council as defined in Art. 6(2) and Art. 
10(2) of Regulation 1175/2011. The Council and the Commission shall regularly inform 
the EP of the application of this regulation. 
4. Council recommendations establishing the existence of macroeconomic imbalances and 
corrective actions (Art. 7.2 Regulation 1176/2011), Council’s adoption of the corrective 
action plan of the concerned Member State (Art. 8.2) and Council’s decision establishing 
non-compliance (Art. 10.4).  
5. The adoption of a Council decision (Art. 126.6 TFEU), recommendation (Art. 126.7 
TFEU), notice (Art. 126.9 TFEU) or sanction (Art. 126.11 TFEU) regarding the EDP. As a 
rule, the Council is expected to follow the recommendations and proposals of the 
Commission or explain its position publicly.35 
6. The adoption of a Council decision imposing sanctions to Member States failing to 
comply with the medium-term budgetary objective or infringing the SGP, as well as fines 
on those failing to take effective action to correct the excessive deficits.36 
7. The adoption of a Council decision imposing sanctions on Member States failing to 
comply with the corrective action for the macroeconomic imbalances, including fines 
when the infringement persists.37 
The EP is already making use of all these economic dialogues in the European Semester 
cycle. To start with, the Commissioners for Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Employment usually appear in November before the relevant committees of the EP 
(ECON/EMPL) to present the Annual Growth Survey (AGS) and the Alert Mechanism 
Report (AMR) before the start of a new European Semester. These exchanges of views have 
proved very valuable, but the EP does not yet have the capacity to influence the 
Commission’s guidelines. The EP may publish an own initiative report on the AGS and issue 
an opinion on the employment guidelines. Last year, the resolution was adopted in 
February, when the ministers of finance in the Council had already discussed their 
conclusions on the AGS and the AMR, as well as the main priority areas. To have any 
impact, the EP’s resolutions should be released earlier in the process. By means of an inter-
institutional agreement (or as part of the framework agreement on relations between the EP 
and the Commission), the Commission could commit to explain how it is taking the EP’s 
views into account.38 Although some argue that the nature of the process is rather 
‘technocratic’ and thus there is no need to involve the EP further, it is beyond question that, 
in today’s context, adoption of the EU’s main economic priorities entails a fair dose of 
politics and, therefore, justifies to some extent a stronger parliamentary dimension.   
                                                   
35 Regulation No 1467/97 as amended by Regulation 1177/2011. 
36 Regulation 1173/2011. 
37 Regulation 1174/2011. 
38 In fact in the draft of country-specific recommendations, the Commission mentions that the 
resolution of the EP has been taken into account. 
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Figure 11. The participation of the EP in the European Semester 
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Source: Authors’ own elaboration.  
The ECFIN Commissioner presents the in-depth reviews and macroeconomic imbalances 
before the ECON Committee around April. In the subsequent process of discussing and 
adopting the country-specific recommendations, the EP has no decision-making powers but 
can hold economic dialogues with both the Commission and the Council. During the 2013 
Semester Cycle, the ECFIN and EMPL Commissioners presented on 17 June 2013 the draft 
country-specific recommendations before the ECON and EMPL Committees. The Irish 
Minister of Finance explained the Council’s position to the members of the ECON 
Committee in the following week (24 June), and the European Council endorsed them just 
five days later (29 June). The Lithuanian President explained the country-specific 
recommendations as adopted by the Council on 9 July. An Economic Dialogue on the euro 
area country-specific recommendations with the President of the Eurogroup took place on 5 
September 2013. For the effective exercise of the parliamentary oversight, the hearing with 
the Commission should take place earlier and the Council and the European Council should 
inform the EP about their positions and deliberations in real time. 
In its report on the “European Semester for economic policy coordination: Implementation of 
2013 priorities”, the EP (2013a) welcomed the fact that the 2013 country-specific 
recommendations were much more detailed than the year before, gave more insight on 
compliance by Member States, were more in tune with national specificities, had a stronger 
focus on growth, employment and competitiveness and included recommendations for the 
euro area as a whole (and not only for individual countries). Notwithstanding these positive 
observations, the EP called for the introduction of the Europe 2020 national objectives into 
the recommendations issued to Member States under economic adjustment programmes and 
called on Member States to include the Europe 2020 progress report in their contributions to 
the European Semester. It also asked the Commission to carry out a thorough ex-ante 
assessment of the short- and long-term social impact of newly proposed reforms. It is still to 
be seen the extent to which these considerations will be taken into account in the future.  
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The EP can also play an important role in monitoring the implementation of the country-
specific recommendations. In December 2013, it invited the President of the ECOFIN – the 
Lithuanian Minister of Finance – for an economic dialogue. In January 2014, there was also a 
dialogue with the Greek Minister of Finance about the 2014 Semester cycle. The President of 
the Eurogroup was invited on 20 February. The role of the EP in ensuring the enforcement of 
the country-specific recommendations and other recommendations related to the 
development of the European Semester could be strengthened if the necessary resources 
were provided. As provided in Regulation 473/2013, in autumn, the competent committee of 
the EP could hold economic Dialogues with the Commission and the Presidents of the 
Council and the Eurogroup to discuss the content of the draft budgetary plans, the 
Commission’s opinions and the discussions in the Eurogroup and the related Council’s acts. 
This monitoring task by the EP may be facilitated by the recent inclusion of reporting 
guidelines indicating how measures in the draft budgetary plans address country-specific 
recommendations and the targets set in the Europe 2020 strategy and on the expected 
distributional impact of the main expenditure and revenue measures.   
Finally, the EP may also offer the opportunity to the Member State that is the object of a 
Council recommendation or decision to participate in an exchange of views. In 2013, there 
were economic dialogues with the Ministers of Economy and Finance of Italy, Malta and 
Slovenia and in 2014 for Spain, and a planned dialogue with France was postponed.39 
3.3.2 The parliamentary oversight of the CCI, the enhanced budgetary surveillance 
and the macroeconomic adjustment programmes  
In addition to its contribution to the European Semester, the EP can also play an important 
role in the oversight of the macroeconomic adjustment programmes and the enhanced 
budgetary surveillance of euro-area members under financial difficulties – in case a country 
is placed under this condition in the future. It is also important, in terms of input legitimacy, 
that the EP is not marginalised from the adoption of arrangements of a contractual nature 
with Member States if negotiations eventually materialise in agreement.  
At the moment, negotiations are being carried out on the terms of the “individual 
arrangements of a contractual nature with the EU institutions on the reforms promoting 
growth and jobs”.40 The Convergence and Competitiveness Instrument (CCI), as proposed 
by the Commission, refers on the one hand to the contractual arrangement with Member 
States to adopt a number of measures to implement the country-specific recommendations – 
especially those emanating from the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) – and, on 
the other, it includes a mechanism for financial support for the implementation of costly 
reforms.41 
It is still to be seen whether such as an instrument would be voluntary or obligatory for euro-
area members and how it will be made available to non-members. Everything seems to 
indicate, however, that if the Commission and the government of the concerned Member 
State fail to reach an agreement, of if the agreement is not approved by the Council, there 
will not be a contractual arrangement. At national level, each government would therefore 
be accountable to its parliament. 
                                                   
39 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/ 
publications.html?id=ECON00012#menuzone. 
40 See Van Rompuy (2012). 
41 European Commission (2013).  
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Financial support, conditional on the full and timely implementation of the reforms set out in 
the contractual arrangements, could be obtained via specific contributions (based e.g. on the 
GNI42 key) or new own financial resources, and be included in the EU budget as external 
assigned revenues (therefore, over and beyond the MFF ceilings), as proposed by the 
Commission and supported by the EP.43 In this case, the EP would be entitled to authorise 
the budget appropriations. The European Council, however, is also discussing the use of 
loans and it is not yet certain whether the financial facility will be adopted by means of 
secondary legislation under the community method, which would guarantee the role of the 
EP in the process.44 
In the case of enhanced surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or 
threatened with serious financial difficulties, according to Regulation 472/2013 of the two 
pack, the competent committee of the EP could invite representatives of the Commission, the 
ECB and the IMF to participate in an economic dialogue. The EP could also invite 
representatives from the Member State concerned and the Commission to participate in an 
exchange of views about the recommendations and the adjustment programmes.45  
In relation to countries under adjustment programmes, the EP asked the Commission in the 
2013 report on the European Semester to adapt the ‘troika’ model to the new provisions in 
the six- and the two-packs in order to improve its democratic accountability, and also to 
conduct and publish internal ex-post evaluations of its recommendations and its 
participation in the Troika. However, progress so far has been quite modest. Since the entry 
into force of Regulation 472/2013 in March 2013, there have just been updates of the Irish, 
Portuguese and Cypriot macroeconomic adjustment programmes to Art. 7(5) – and also 7(2) 
in the case of Cyprus.46 The Commission’s evaluation of the adjustment programmes 
(following the new obligations provided in the regulation) has been very limited.47 In 
February 2014, the President of the Eurogroup appeared before the ECON Committee to 
explain the implementation of the macroeconomic adjustment programmes, but no economic 
dialogue has taken place so far with the Commission.48 
The EP Resolution of 13 March 2014 on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika 
with regard to the euro-area programme countries assessed the main shortcomings in 
legitimacy of the functioning of the Troika in recent years, highlighting the poor democratic 
accountability of its decision-making process at national level and the lack of it at EU level. It 
                                                   
42 Gross National Income (GNI) is broadly the same as GDP except that it adds what a country earns 
from overseas investments and subtracts what foreigners earn in a country and send back home. 
43 See European Parliament (2013a, p. 8). 
44 Annotated Agenda of the Sherpa meeting 
(http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/files/2013/11/Sherpa.pdf). 
45 Regulation 472/2013. 
46 The Regulation's macroeconomic adjustment programme provisions do not apply to Spain, but the 
country will be subject to post-programme surveillance in accordance with Art. 14 of the 
Regulation as soon as the current financial assistance programme ends (also Ireland).  
47 According to the Commission, because “the short timeframe during which this Regulation has 
been in force provides limited evidence on which to base this evaluation”. See European 
Commission (2014).  
48 In the case of ministers of the states concerned, only the Greek Minister of Finance has appeared 
before the committee for an exchange of views (11 November 2012), although there is one planned 
with Portugal later this year. See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/ 
publications.html?id=ECON00012#menuzone. 
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insisted on the need to establish ”clear, transparent and binding rules of procedure for the 
interaction between the institutions within the Troika and the allocation of tasks and 
responsibility therein”, noting a number of institutional weaknesses and conflicts regarding 
the role of the Commission, the ECB, the Council and the Eurogroup that should be 
addressed.49  
3.3.3 Boost the political accountability of the European Council, the Eurogroup 
and the ECB 
In order to give a quick and strong response to the economic and financial crisis, the 
European Council acquired a salient role in the initiation, adoption and implementation of 
measures regarding the governance of EMU. But this has sometimes transpired to the 
detriment of the EP. Additionally, the growing powers of the European Council have not 
encompassed the provision of mechanisms to ensure its democratic legitimacy at EU level. 
The argument that the Heads of Government and State are already accountable at national 
level should not be used to obstruct this development for several reasons. The full-time 
President of the European Council, who is not accountable at national level, has important 
agenda-setting and policy-shaping powers. And the meetings of the President’s Cabinet with 
the ‘sherpas’ – representatives of the heads of government – have become very important in 
the functioning of this institution. In addition, some Member States are more influential and 
some major decisions do not require unanimity. Moreover, the parliamentary scrutiny of the 
actions of the heads of government or state in the European Council is rather weak in many 
Member States.50  
The President of the European Council is only obliged by the treaties to present a report to 
the EP after each of the summits (Art. 15.6 TEU). This reporting usually takes place before 
the so-called “enlarged Conference of Presidents”.51 There was only one occasion in 2013 
when the President of the European Council (Herman Van Rompuy) reported to the plenary 
session. These hearings constitute an ex-post marginal source of information. According to 
the rules of procedure of the Euro Summits, adopted on 14 March 2013 upon the entry into 
force of the TSCG, the President of the European Council has to report to the EP after each of 
the meetings.52 There has not been a Euro Summit since then, but if – as envisaged in the 
rules of procedure – this finally takes place in the aftermath of the European Council 
meetings, one can expect that the President will report to the EP about both meetings at the 
same time.53  
The Eurogroup meets once a month, on the eve of the meeting of the Economic and Financial 
Affairs Council of the EU (ECOFIN) and is responsible for the preparation and follow-up of 
Euro Summit meetings.54 The President of the Eurogroup is not accountable to the EP, 
although s/he might be invited to take part in an economic dialogue in the framework of the 
                                                   
49 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0239&language=EN. 
50 See Hefftler et al. (2013).  
51 A Conference of Presidents of the EP that can be attended by other MEPs. 
52 See Council of the European Union (2013).  
53 Unless an EMU subcommittee is finally set up and the President of the Council is invited to report 
on the Euro Summits in that setting.  
54 The Eurogroup is the informal body that brings together the finance ministers of countries whose 
currency is the euro. The Commission’s Vice-President for Economic and Monetary Affairs, as well 
as the President of the European Central Bank, also participate in Eurogroup meetings. 
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six- and the two-packs. According to the latter, s/he can be invited to discuss the 
Eurogroup’s opinion on the national draft budgetary plans submitted by euro-area members 
in October. Where necessary, s/he can also be invited to discuss some aspects of the 
operation of the ESM, which s/he chairs.55 Although inter-governmental in nature, the ESM 
is an essential element to the functioning of the euro area and powers to disburse financial 
assistance, establish conditionality and monitor its compliance require some degree of 
parliamentary accountability at EU level. The Eurogroup has also shown that it exercises 
significant leverage on the Commission when deciding the scope of this assistance and the 
conditionality attached.56 Jeroen Dijsselbloem, the current President of the Eurogroup, has 
participated so far in three economic dialogues: one on the Cyprus adjustment programme (7 
May 2013), a second on the implementation of the euro area-relevant country-specific 
recommendations (5 September 2013) and a third on the implementation of the adjustment 
programmes and the six-month priorities of the Eurogroup (20 February 2014). The 
provision of a full-time president of the Eurogroup would make a stronger case for 
improving the parliamentary oversight of its activities.  
In relation to the ESM, its Managing Director, Klaus Regling, also participated in an 
exchange of views with members of the ECON committee on 24 September 2013, admitting 
the importance of this dialogue between the EP and the ESM and his readiness to answer 
written questions when possible.57 The ESM sends its annual report and audit report to the 
EP. 
Monetary Dialogues with the ECB and supervisory hearings with the Chair of the SSM are 
also of high importance, in particular in view of its new powers on banking supervision. Art. 
20 of Regulation 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the ECB concerning the supervision 
of credit institutions provides that the ECB has to cooperate with any investigations by the 
EP and that, upon request, the chair of the supervisory board will hold confidential oral 
discussions with the chair and vice-chair of the competent committee of the EP. According to 
the inter-institutional agreement struck by the EP in the negotiations on the single 
supervisory mechanism:  
i) The chair of the supervisory board has to appear once a year before the EP to present the 
annual report on the execution of its tasks and has to participate in two public hearings. 
Additional ad hoc exchanges of views and special confidential meetings can also be held.  
ii) The appointment of the chair of the supervisory board requires the approval of the EP. 
                                                   
55 In a letter of 22 March 2011, the President of the Eurogroup and the Ecfin Commissioner 
committed on behalf of the Council and the COM to inform the EP on a regular basis about the 
establishment and the operations of the ESM. See Annex 3 of the European Parliament resolution 
of 23 March 2011 on the draft European Council decision amending Art. 136 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union with regard to a stability mechanism for Member States whose 
currency is the euro 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-
0103+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN#BKMD-4). 
56 See the EP resolution of 13 March 2014 on the enquiry on the role and operations of the Troika 
(ECB, Commission and IMF) with regard to the euro-area programme countries, point 50. 
(www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2014-
0239&language=EN). 
57 See note on the EP website examining the relationship between the ESM and the EP. 
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iii) The ECB has to reply in writing to written questions put to it by the EP and provide the 
competent committee with a record of the proceedings of the supervisory board, 
including a list of the decisions adopted and those objected to by the Governing Council.  
iv) In the event that a credit institution is declared bankrupt, non-confidential information 
will also be disclosed ex-post.  
The Resolution Board is accountable not only to the Council and the Commission, but also to 
the EP, and must keep all three institutions informed of its activities on a regular basis and to 
participate in hearings with the EP.  
3.3.4 The EP’s organisational structure 
Either through legislation or informal agreements, the European Council and the Council 
have adapted their organisational structures to better deal with the governance of the euro 
area (e.g. voting rules, Eurogroup and Euro Summits). In the case of the EP, the issue 
remains an open question. On the one hand, euro-countries MEPs defend the need to 
improve the parliamentary oversight of the euro-area governance and their involvement in 
the process. On the other, the EP represents the European (not national) citizens (Arts 10 and 
14 TEU), the euro is meant to be the currency of the whole EU (Art. 3 TEU) and the Union 
must respect the equality of citizens and Member States across the Union (Arts 4 and 9 TEU). 
As pointed out elsewhere, the proposal to create a Euro-Parliament formed by MEPs and 
MPs from the euro-area countries would not only create an unnecessary additional layer to 
the already complex EU political system, but it will also be in flagrant conflict with core 
treaty principles and contribute to the ‘institutional secession’ of the euro area.58 The 
alternative proposal to limit the EP’s voting rights to euro-area MEPs when dealing with 
euro affairs and legislation would breach the treaty conception of the EP as the 
representative chamber of all the European citizens. It would also be questionable on the 
grounds that MEPs from ‘pre-in’ countries would be deprived of their voting rights in the 
development of EMU, which they will eventually join.  
If a stronger role on the part of the EP in EU economic governance is in part justified by the 
fact that it represents all European citizens and promotes EU common good and the rights of 
all Member States, any institutional reform to improve the parliamentary dimension of the 
euro area should not contravene these core principles. As an alternative to the proposals 
above mentioned, the party coordinators of the ECON Committee made recently a 
suggestion for a possible creation of a subcommittee to deal with the scrutiny of the EMU, 
which in principle is compatible with these goals and the treaties’ principles.59 The legislative 
role – and the parliamentary oversight of non EMU-specific policies – would be confined to 
the ECON Committee, whereas the sub-committee would manage non-legislative scrutiny 
tasks related to the euro area, the banking union and the fiscal compact – mainly economic 
and monetary dialogues and the preparatory work for non-legislative acts of the main 
committee. The EMU sub-committee would ultimately report to the ECON Committee.  
                                                   
58 See for instance A. Maurer, ‘From EMU to DEMU: The Democratic Legitimacy of the EU and the 
European Parliament’, IAI Working Papers 13/11, April 2013; European Parliament, Report on 
constitutional problems of a multitier governance in the European Union, A7-0372/2013a. 
59 See letter of the former Chair of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee to the President of 
the European Parliament on the Structure and Modalities with the Parliament for euro-area 
governance in the next legislature (http://sylvie-goulard.eu/articles2014/Annex-3a-Chair-s-
Announcements-ECON-structure.pdf). 
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Figure 12. Balance of power of the political groups in the 8th EP: EU28 vs. euro area 
 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
The most problematic issue with this proposal is that participation in a sub-committee 
cannot be restricted to MEPs of specific Member States. Therefore, it would require the 
agreement of all the political groups to send MEPs that have been elected in euro-area 
countries. However, should the composition of the sub-committee reflect the composition of 
the euro area or the composition of the EP, as all committees do? Figure 12 shows the 
winners or the losers in both cases.60 Composition reflecting the distribution of seats in the 
EP would enhance the power of those groups that, as ECR and EFDD, have a higher 
proportion of MEPs coming from non-euro-area members. Whether allocating the sub-
committee seats according to the composition of the euro area would benefit the other 
political groups with a higher percentage of MEPs coming from euro-area members, 
especially the GUE/NGL group. The existing sub-committees (Human Rights and Security 
and Defence) reflect – as the main committees – the composition of the EP. An allocation 
based on the actual composition of the euro area would be more representative but would 
create an unprecedented case that could accentuate the existing divisions between euro and 
non-euro-area countries.  
 Inter-parliamentary cooperation with national parliaments 
Given the dual legitimisation of the EU political system both at national and EU level, the 
engagement of the national parliaments is paramount to the process. Enhanced inter-
parliamentary cooperation between the EP and the national parliaments can contribute to 
this goal.61 
The participation of MPs in the inter-parliamentary European week in late January or early 
February every year should enable them to debate the key findings and conclusions from the 
                                                   
60 The estimates have been made according to the affiliation of the parties in the outgoing Parliament 
given that the composition of the political groups in the incoming Parliament is still unknown. 
61 Dual legitimation refers to the two channels to legitimize EU decision-making. Through EP 
elections voters elect and hold accountable their European representatives and through national 
elections they elect and hold accountable their representatives in the European Council (and the 
Council).  
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Annual Growth Survey, the Alert Mechanism and other related issues. In this way, they 
could hold appropriate hearings with the members of their government in relation to the 
adoption of the conclusions on the AGS by the Council and the provision of the policy 
orientations by the European Council. They would also be in a better position to scrutinise 
the draft national reform programmes that their governments must submit to the 
Commission in April. The inter-parliamentary European week may also allow the EP to 
collect the views of the national parliaments for its resolutions on the AGS and the 
employment guidelines. However, the size of the parliaments’ delegations –and ultimately of 
the conference itself – complicates the exchange of views between the national parliaments 
and with the EP and the management of the event, with negative consequences in terms of 
impact and visibility.  
This problem has become more prominent with the co-celebration of the Inter- parliamentary 
Conference on Economic and Financial Governance (EFG) of the European Union (envisaged 
in Art. 13 TSCG), following the conclusions of the Conference of Speakers of EU Parliaments 
in Nicosia in spring 2013.62 The second meeting of the inter-parliamentary conference EFG, 
which was first convened by the Lithuanian Presidency in Vilnius in October 2013, took 
place in the framework of the 2014 European Parliamentary Week in Brussels and was co-
organised by the EP and the Hellenic Parliament. The size and composition of each 
delegation is decided by the respective national parliaments and the EP itself and, therefore, 
the conference itself tends to be too large and difficult to manage in an effective way. In the 
2013 Parliamentary week, there were over 100 members of national parliaments and around 
80 officials. Moreover, the conference may only adopt non-binding conclusions by consensus 
on matters of economic and financial governance of the EU related to the agenda of the 
meeting. Against this backdrop, the conference might eventually not be attractive enough for 
relevant MPs to attend, which would further damage its impact and visibility.   
The second meeting of the inter-parliamentary conference on EFG takes place in autumn as a 
replacement of the meetings of the chairpersons of the relevant committees   organised after 
the summer break by the parliament of the country holding the rotating presidency of the 
Council, which allowed for a less representative but more constructive interaction between 
parliaments. If it were held early enough and run effectively, the new inter-parliamentary 
conference on EFG could promote discussions with the national parliaments on the country-
specific recommendations in view of their eventual incorporation in the draft national 
budgets and could feed into the EP’s resolution on the implementation of the European 
Semester. However, the large size of the conference, the modest scope of its mandate and the 
difficulties to reconcile divergent positions on the rules of procedures all seem to be setting 
the scene for a low profile event. 
The inter-parliamentary conference on EFG has fallen short of expectations to actively 
engage the parliaments of the euro countries in the oversight of the new economic 
governance. The proposal to create a sub-conference only formed by MPs and MEPs coming 
from euro-area members to meet on the margins of the main conference would complicate 
the agenda of the MPs and add an additional layer to the system. In view of the protracted 
negotiations on the creation of the conference itself, it is also likely that it would be strongly 
contested by non-euro-area members.63 As an alternative, the creation of an EMU sub-
committee of the ECON Committee would allow for the organisation of inter-parliamentary 
                                                   
62 See http://www.senate.be/event/20130422-Nicosia/Conclusions_Speakers_ConferenceEN_24-4-
2013.pdf. 
63 An overview of the process can be found at Kreilinger (2013).  
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meetings with the relevant members of the related committees in the national parliaments of 
the euro-area countries (e.g. budget, finance and employment). The meetings could then take 
place at the most appropriate time during the European Semester and draw in the most 
appropriate representatives in order to streamline the delivery of results. 
In order to improve EU democratic accountability at national level, enhanced inter-
parliamentary cooperation should be accompanied by the reinforcement of the 
Commission’s political dialogue with the national parliaments and a stronger commitment 
on the part of national governments. In particular, the Commission could communicate the 
country-specific recommendations to the national parliament concerned in the framework of 
the political dialogue, and the parliament could then hold a question-and-answer session 
with its respective government. It would also be necessary for governments to provide their 
parliaments with accurate and timely information about the negotiations in the Council and 
the European Council. The Commission (as provided for in Regulation 473/2013) could also 
appear before the concerned national parliament to present its opinion on the national draft 
budgetary plan, with the national minister giving further account of the discussions in the 
Eurogroup. In the case of Member States under enhanced surveillance, economic dialogues 
between the national parliament and the Commission, and the ECB where appropriate, 
could be promoted as well.  
 Increasing politicisation in the EP and the Commission  
Beyond reinforcing the role of the EP and its scrutiny powers, the input legitimacy of EMU 
governance could also be improved by promoting citizens’ participation in the election of 
their representatives at EU level. Unlike national governments, the European Commission is 
not elected by citizens or the members of the party able to secure a sufficient majority in the 
EP. Moreover, voter turnout in the elections to the EP is very low as compared to national 
elections. Proposals to upgrade these circumstances are often suggested so as to improve EU 
democratic legitimacy. However, the initial steps taken in this direction have had a limited 
impact due to the peculiarities of EU political system. The euro-area crisis and the reform of 
EMU economic governance have propelled the EU to the front of the public debate, 
contributing to its politicisation and the change in perceptions that the EU was mostly about 
‘policies’ and not that much about ‘politics’. The polarisation of the debates had the potential 
to increase political conflict in the EP and make the left/right cleavage clearer, bringing 
Europe closer to the citizens and boosting participation in the European elections. A stronger 
involvement of the EP in the selection of the President of the Commission according with a 
specific political programme could also contribute to this goal. Progress in both directions, 
however, must be taken with caution.  
3.5.1 Politics in the European Parliament 
That the economic and financial crisis has brought the EU to the forefront of the public 
debate in many EU countries has been particularly evident in the recent election campaigns 
to the EP. Traditionally focused on national issues and domestic politics, this year’s elections 
revolved around the EU more than in the past. However, political conflict has increased the 
pro- vs. anti- EU divide rather than the traditional right-left cleavage.64 Whereas in some 
countries such as in the UK the focus was on EU membership itself, in others the ‘anti’ voices 
were directed at particular policies (e.g. the euro, fiscal discipline, austerity, immigration, 
enlargement), the EU’s growing intrusiveness or ‘politics as usual’.   
                                                   
64 See Piedrafita & Lauenroth (2014). 
ENHANCING THE LEGITIMACY OF EMU GOVERNANCE | 49 
 
This was eventually reflected in the outcome of the elections. Although the elections to the 
EP tend to penalise ruling and large parties, the protest vote in its different versions this year 
was much more relevant and radical than before. As Table 3 shows, the mainstream political 
parties have generally lost votes and their groups in the EP (EPP, S&D, ALDE and Greens) 
have all lost seats. The ‘anti-austerity’ message brought substantial gains to the European 
left, and especially to the party of its leading European candidate, Alexis Tsipras, who won 
the elections in Greece. Eurosceptic or ‘eurocritic’ parties of different kinds improved their 
share of the vote and representation in 13 Member States, reaching in most of these countries 
over 15% of the total. In the UK, France and Denmark, they won the elections ahead of 
conservatives and socialists. As a result, the European Conservative and Reformists (ECR) 
and European Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) groups have increased their 
representation in the new EP. The ECR has indeed become the third-largest group and the 
main opposition to the two largest groups, the European People’s Party (EPP) and the 
Socialists and Democrats (S&D), which – as the result of the new allocation of seats – will 
have to work together in the coming years in order to build majorities to adopt decisions and 
passing legislation. 
Table 3. Composition of the outgoing and incoming EPs 
 
7th EP :  
June 2009  
7th EP : 
May 2014 
8th EP 
June 2014 
EPP 265 273 221 
S&D 184 196 191 
ALDE/ADLE 84 83 67 
Greens/EFA 55 57 50 
ECR 54 57 70 
GUE-NGL 35 35 52 
EFD 32 31 48 
NI 27 33 52 
TOTAL 736 765 751 
Source: Authors’ own elaboration. 
This is not something new. Despite increasing politicisation of EU policies, the EP tends to 
form large majorities that usually include the two main political groups (EPP and S&D) so as 
to reinforce its position in the negotiations with the Council. As shown in Table 4, this trend 
increased in the 7th EP, with the EPP and S&D voting together in 73.64% of the total roll call 
votes. Still, the EPP and the S&D were not part of the winning coalition in around 10% and 
16% of the votes, respectively. In the incoming EP, this tendency is likely to increase since 
conservatives and socialists will in most cases need each other to form a winning coalition. 
This might come at the cost of politics in the EP and the fading out of the right-left divide, 
whereas the strong presence of right Eurosceptics – although split into different groups and 
non-attached members – will accentuate the pro- vs. anti-EU divide. 
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Table 4. Voting coalitions in the 6th and 7th terms of the EP 
 2004-2009 : PPE-DE + PSE 2009-2014 : EPP + S&D 
Culture & Education 77.61% 98.75% 
Regional Development 82.91% 97.03% 
Budget 74.94% 89.33% 
Internal Regulations of the EP 70.59% 87.50% 
Constitutional & Interinst. Affairs 78.40% 85.88% 
Judicial Affairs 98.15% 83.80% 
Transport & Tourism 74.01% 81.53% 
Agriculture 80.06% 80.75% 
Fisheries 87.07% 79.75% 
Foreign & Security Policy 70.18% 77.72% 
Int. Market & Consumer Protection 67.31% 77.30% 
Gender Equality 58.27% 71.04% 
Development 64.04% 71.03% 
International Trade 67.06% 71.03% 
Industry. Research & Energy 68.52% 68.52% 
Employment & Social Affairs 56.50% 67.89% 
Budgetary Control 86.49% 67.35% 
Economic & Monetary Affairs 52.43% 66.73% 
Civil Liberties. JHA 63.65% 66.28% 
Environment & Public Health 59.70% 56.56% 
Petitions 72% 35.29% 
ALL POLICY AREAS 69.65% 73.64% 
Data source: http://www.votewatch.eu/ 
3.5.2 The indirect election of the President of the Commission 
A progressively stronger involvement of the EP in the selection of the President of the 
Commission, in accordance with a specific political programme, could also contribute to the 
goal of increasing the political capital of the EP and citizens’ interest in the elections. The 
Commission has now a stronger leverage over decisions that involve economic policy 
choices and that have a strong impact on national tax and spending policies, and such an 
initiative would contribute to enhancing its democratic legitimacy.  
As a first step in this direction, the EP last year adopted a resolution encouraging European 
political parties to nominate candidates for the position of Commission President, who 
would also lead pan-European campaigns. The resolution also called on the European 
Council to give first consideration to the candidate of the party winning most seats in the 
elections.65 However, the initiative had a very limited impact on the electoral campaign and 
                                                   
65 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/ficheprocedure.do?reference=2013/2102(INL)&l=en 
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voter turnout in most Member States, where national parties and domestic politics continued 
to be more prominent.66 It is also difficult for such an initiative to take off if the candidates 
for the position of Commission President cannot base their campaigns on a clear political 
programme for the coming years and if there are uncertainties about whether the European 
Council would consider them at all. Therefore, there are a number of obstacles that would 
need to be overcome for such an initiative to work.  
It is argued that the proposal of candidates to the position of Commission President by the 
European political parties and his or her selection through the elections to the EP could 
increase the ‘politicisation’ of the Commission, when the treaty establishes that it has to carry 
out its functions independently. Moreover, its increased powers in monitoring national 
economic and budgetary policies make a stronger case for improving its neutrality. 
However, a key role of the EP in the selection of the President of the Commission does not 
guarantee his/her independence or neutrality. Furthermore, although the President plays a 
key role in the Commission, the political composition of the College will continue to be 
determined by the ideological affiliation of the members of the European Council, who 
ultimately proposes the other 27 Commissioners. The role of the President in the selection 
process is very limited, and so is the role of the EP, which only has the capacity to accept or 
veto the whole Commission. In a similar vein, the EP can only oblige the whole Commission 
to resign by approving a motion of censure by a two-thirds majority. Therefore, the 
relationship between the Commission and the EP cannot be compared to that of the national 
parliaments with their respective governments.  
In conclusion, there are several ways in which the input legitimacy of the euro area can be 
increased: the role of the EP in its governance can be reinforced; the parliamentary 
accountability of the European Council, the Eurogroup and the European Central Bank can 
be improved; the EP can be endowed with the necessary tools to effectively conduct the 
economic and monetary dialogues; and the inter-parliamentary cooperation between the EP 
and the national parliaments can be upgraded. The increase of the political conflict in the EP 
and the indirect election of the President of the Commission through the European elections 
could contribute to reducing the gap with the citizens and boosting participation in the 
elections, promoting acceptance and support for the EU. However, political conflict seems to 
be increasing around the pro/anti-EU cleavage, whereas the right/left divide risks being 
diluted even more in the next legislature. Moreover, the initiative to nominate leading 
candidates by the European political parties for the position of Commission President will 
fail in its goals to promote genuine European elections and to enhance the citizens’ say if the 
existing flaws are not resolved.   
                                                   
66 Piedrafita & Lauenroth (2014). 
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4. Output legitimacy and EMu externalities 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Reducing the EMU functioning externalities would provide higher benefits to euro-
area members, thereby increasing the output legitimacy of EMU. 
 One way is to undertake institutional reforms that aim to reduce the risk of an 
idiosyncratic shock turning into a systemic shock. This could be achieved through the 
creation of a fully-fledged banking union and the development of more effective 
market-based systems of risk-sharing. 
 A second avenue, which foresees even deeper changes, considers the option of 
equipping EMU with additional institutions that could directly tackle the emergence of 
negative externalities associated with idiosyncratic shocks. This could be achieved by 
setting up a common fiscal capacity, namely through the establishment of a European 
unemployment insurance scheme. 
In addition to the inadequacies of the SGP to ensure the stability of EMU, the crisis has 
highlighted deficiencies associated with the absence of appropriate instruments to withstand 
asymmetric shocks.67 Federal states, such as the United States, are usually equipped with 
common safety nets (like a federal budget) and a full banking union. Their role is to work as 
fiscal and market risk-sharing mechanisms, respectively, with the objective of minimising the 
probability and/or the size of welfare losses. This is usually achieved by smoothing out 
either consumption or income over time. 
When the global financial crisis hit EMU in 2008, with monetary policy constrained by the 
ECB price stability mandate, no banking union and no common fiscal instrument, the only 
possible response for the EU (there was no specific EMU reaction at that time) was to 
coordinate national fiscal policies. This resulted in the European Economic Recovery Plan, 
which provided assistance amounting to 1.5% of EU GDP over two years, with a 
contribution from the EU budget amounting to 0.3% of GDP. This tiny figure, with an 
uncertain outcome, was hardly comparable to the size of the fiscal stimulus programme 
launched immediately in the United States after the outbreak of the crisis worth more than 
€600 billon (i.e. around 5% of GDP). By contrast, policy responses in Europe were mainly 
national.  
The subsequent waves of the crisis that have more specifically hit EMU did not lead to any 
common response either. In the absence of a common EMU response and of any risk-sharing 
mechanism, the burden of the adjustment has fallen disproportionally on some countries, 
resulting in divergent growth paths, with gaps widening over time and narrowing only 
more recently. Such divergences, which have infected the economic, social and political 
spheres, have put at risk the entire EMU architecture. In the end, Europe responded by 
increasing the institutional coordination of national fiscal and macroeconomic policies, rather 
than by introducing countercyclical monetary and/or fiscal policies.  
                                                   
67 This chapter is primarily concerned with the 18 EU Member States that have already adopted the 
euro as their currency and that currently comprise the euro area, as opposed to the larger 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which includes both the 18 euro-area Member States and 
the 10 non-euro Member States. 
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The entire EMU governance system is based on the idea of crisis prevention. Rules about 
fiscal and macroeconomic stability and early warnings aim at averting the emergence of 
shocks rather than dealing with the absorption of their adverse effects. A deepened policy 
coordination ex-ante (also in areas of national competence) was intended to facilitate the 
convergence of the economies of EMU, preventing the creation of harmful imbalances and 
forcing all members to strengthen their economies by enhancing competitiveness. When the 
crisis stroke, the system proved to fail and also proved unprepared to deal ex-post with 
asymmetric shocks. 
Since 2010, EMU has been strongly affected by large country-specific shocks, originating 
from fiscal and current account imbalances in Greece, credit and housing booms / burst and 
a banking crisis in Ireland and Spain, structural problems related to low productivity growth 
in Portugal and Italy. The adverse effects of these shocks split EMU in two parts in terms of 
growth developments: the countries of the euro-area periphery experienced negative growth 
rates and fast rising unemployment rates. The core economies enjoyed reasonable growth 
and historically low unemployment rates. Figure 13 illustrates the sharp increase in the 
degree of heterogeneity (measured by standard deviation) of some key economic variables 
after 2010. The projections for after 2014 shown in the graph suggest an easing in the degree 
of divergence of the flow variables (budget deficits and real GDP growth) in the medium 
term. By contrast only limited convergence is foreseen for stock variables, such as the level of 
unemployment and, in particular, the level of public debt. Even assuming that EMU 
economies converge towards a common path in the long run, the economic and social impact 
of asymmetric shocks may be large in the short run if no stabilisation mechanism is available. 
Figure 13. The degree of heterogeneity* inside the euro area 
 
* Heterogeneity is defined as the standard deviation of economic indicators inside the euro area.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration on IMF data, 2014. 
The high degree of heterogeneity illustrated in the figure is largely the result of the absence 
of adequate tools to absorb asymmetric shocks. Particularly in the euro area, the introduction 
of the single currency and the consequent definition of a single monetary policy have greatly 
reduced the space for countercyclical monetary policy traditionally employed to mitigate 
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economic shocks. At the same time, weak public finance positions of some Member States 
meant that most hit crisis countries did not have either the fiscal policy tool available to 
stabilize the economy.   
The IMF has recently quantified the economic costs imposed by the absence of common 
EMU instruments to counteract the adverse effects of asymmetric shocks (Fuceri and 
Zdzienicka, 2013). While the share of unsmoothed asymmetric fluctuations is only about 25% 
for the US economy and about 20% for the German economy (the two monetary unions 
taken as a reference for the exercise), the share of unsmoothed asymmetric fluctuations for 
the euro-area economy is almost 70%. This translates into large economic and social losses in 
the concerned Member States and the monetary union as a whole.  
The recent crisis has also shown that when the functioning of EMU imposes excessive costs 
on individual Member States, political support is eroded. This results in tensions in the 
political, institutional and social spheres. If EMU membership is perceived as failing in 
delivering the expected results and its governing bodies are unable to solve the problems 
they are confronted with, the legitimacy of the entire EMU structure is undermined.  
In this perspective, the natural question is whether it is possible to change the functioning of 
EMU so as to improve the efficiency of the response to asymmetric shocks and, as a 
consequence, its legitimacy. This question is pertinent also in the light of the poor 
performance of ex-ante coordination discussed in section 2. 
Seen through that prism, this section intends to analyse changes that could improve the 
capacity to absorb or mitigate negative externalities given the current economic and 
institutional set-up of EMU. 
The cornerstone of a monetary union is its single monetary policy: A single interest rate is set 
by the ECB taking the EMU business cycle as a reference target. Since business cycles are not 
fully synchronised across Member States, monetary policy setting is not adequate for all. 
This implies that the response to asymmetric shocks cannot come from the common 
monetary policy (see Box 2 for an analysis of the difficulties encountered by the ECB in 
setting a single monetary policy that fits all countries, or at least most of them, in recent 
years). 
Acknowledging that a better definition of monetary policy within a monetary union would 
not provide an adequate response to asymmetric shocks, this section intends to analyse two, 
possibly complementary, avenues for increasing the output legitimacy of EMU.  
The more conservative approach calls for institutional developments that aim to reduce the 
risk that idiosyncratic shocks turn into systemic shocks. This can be achieved through the 
creation of a fully-fledged banking union and more effective market-based systems of risk-
sharing. A second avenue, which foresees deeper changes, considers the option of equipping 
EMU with additional institutions that could directly tackle the emergence of negative 
externalities associated with idiosyncratic shocks that could hamper the smooth functioning 
of the monetary union. This could be achieved by building a common fiscal capacity for 
EMU, namely through the establishment of a European68 unemployment insurance scheme. 
 
 
                                                   
68 Although economic reasoning would suggest that the rationale for having such an insurance 
scheme at the euro-area level is stronger than at the EU level, the current debate about a common 
unemployment benefit scheme is extended to all EU countries. 
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Box 2. Output legitimacy: The case of the ECB 
When discussing the legitimacy of the EU, a relevant distinction can be drawn between input and 
output legitimacy. In the construction of the European project, output legitimacy is often advocated 
to offset the lack of input legitimacy and accountability of EU institutions. This issue has emerged 
clearly during the crisis with reference to decisions taken under crisis circumstances and more 
specifically in reference to the ECB.  
As pointed out in Jones (2009), at least until the euro-area crisis of 2012, the ECB benefited from an 
economic consensus on the need for complete political/policy independence of central banks. At 
the same time, it suffered from the ambiguity regarding its democratic credentials: there was a clear 
division between those asserting that the ECB is democratically illegitimate and those claiming that 
its legitimacy is derived from the Member States. Before the crisis struck, however, this major issue 
was allowed to be put aside by the success of the euro and of the ECB in delivering price stability 
and thus offering advantages to citizens of the euro area. 
The economic and financial crisis has represented a turning point. It has, in fact, called into question 
the ECB’s output legitimacy due to its inability to assure price stability, and its monetary policy 
with possible fiscal consequences (mostly due to the use of unconventional monetary policies) has 
been increasingly seen as very problematic. 
Setting up a single monetary policy for EMU, a currency area consisting of a rather heterogeneous 
group of countries,69 was always going to be difficult. It was clear from the start of EMU that the 
‘one size fits all’ policy of the ECB could prove to be potentially inappropriate for a number of euro-
area countries. However, under the assumption that the Member States’ business cycles were 
normally distributed along the EMU business cycle, the ECB policy would at least be approximately 
appropriate for most EMU Member States. The difference between the ECB’s chosen stance and that 
which would be ideal from a national point of view would be very large only for a few outliers, hit 
by idiosyncratic shocks, either positive or negative. 
However, the observed increased divergence among countries’ business cycles during the euro 
crisis is likely to have resulted in ‘hollowing out’ the centre. As capital fled back from the periphery 
towards the core, it exerted a deflationary impact on the periphery and a reflationary impact on the 
core, with some negative output gaps widening and some closing. 
One way to measure the difference of the policy stance is to compare the prediction of a standard 
Taylor rule applied to each Member State and to EMU as a whole. The Taylor rule is a policy 
guideline that generates recommendations for a central bank’s interest rate response to inflation 
and economic activity. In its original formulation (Taylor 1993), the rule implies that the central 
bank policy rate should be set as a function that responds to the equilibrium real interest rate, 
deviations of inflation from the target rate and the output gap:   
 
Where rr denotes the long-term real equilibrium rate, π is the contemporaneous inflation rate and 
π* is the target and  is the output gap. As the real interest rate is a long-term concept and, 
therefore, independent of the business cycle, it can be safely ignored for the purpose of this exercise. 
Moreover, if one assumes that this real long-term rate is the same across countries, its precise value 
does not affect the difference of business cycles across member countries or the difference in the 
appropriate policy rate between any one member country and the one that would be appropriate 
for the euro-area average, which is expected to guide ECB interest rate policy. 
Against this background, in order to assess how well the rate set by the ECB fits EMU member 
countries, we focus on an indicator of the divergence between the policy rates appropriate for any 
given country and that which the ECB should set.  
                                                   
69 For the purpose of this exercise, the euro area is the reference aggregate. 
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There have been many estimates of the policy rules actually followed by central banks, including 
the ECB, with many different variants of the economic variables (unemployment instead of the 
output gap, different measures of inflation, etc.). While the empirical literature has found that the 
round weights proposed originally (1.5 and 0.5) are almost nowhere exactly correct, the range of 
values is actually rather limited. Slightly different weights would not lead to materially different 
results. 
The indicator is then defined as: 
 
Figure 14 below shows the distribution of the differences in interest rates as prescribed by the 
Taylor rule for each country and the EMU on average, weighted by the share of each country in the 
capital of the ECB. 
Figure 14. Distribution of the difference between optimal monetary policy at EMU level and national level 
   
Source: Own elaboration, based on real-time data provided by the European Commission Services, economic 
forecasts. 
The picture illustrates two years: 2004, which in principle should be representative of a calm year, 
and 2013, a more difficult year for monetary policy-setting. The main difference in the two 
distributions, despite the fact that neither is normal, is that while for 2004 most countries had a 
predicted interest rate either slightly above or slightly below that predicted for the ECB, indeed 
most frequencies were concentrated around 0 if one excludes Ireland (which is a clear outlier). In 
2013, the distribution lost its single mode, with a hole around the zero difference. 
What inferences can be drawn from this exercise? During the first years of the euro, the ECB was 
able to deliver in terms of price stability. Indeed, the figure for 2004 seems to suggest that the ECB’s 
common monetary policy over that period was also appropriate for most individual countries in 
EMU. Since the crisis, if one excludes the most recent debate about deflation risks, it shows that the 
ECB has continued to deliver in terms of its price stability target, but the distribution of ‘optimal 
policy rates’ for 2013 would suggest that this has come at the cost of implementing policies that are 
not appropriate for any country in the Union. This implies a cost in terms of welfare, which 
undermines the value of the output delivered and hence the very foundation of legitimacy. 
 The key role of financial markets for a well-functioning EMU 
When talking about shocks and how to withstand them in an efficient manner, it is 
important to consider the nature of the shocks, the mechanisms for risk-sharing and the 
implications for welfare (for a clarification of the concept of risk-sharing, see Box 3).  
Financial markets play a crucial role in establishing risk-sharing mechanisms among the 
residents of different regions/countries exposed to idiosyncratic shocks. This role has been 
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clear since the start-up phase of EMU, as recognised in both the MacDougal Report 
(European Commission, 1977) and Delors Report (European Commission, 1989). 
A well-developed financial system can indeed provide an effective mechanism of loss 
absorption of negative spillover effects among members of a monetary union. Asdrubali et 
al. (1996) find that in the United States, around 40% of shocks to per-capita gross state 
product is smoothed by capital markets (i.e. the cross-ownership of productive assets) and 
around 25% by credit markets (i.e. through lending and borrowing). Similarly, Athanasoulis 
and van Wincoop (2001) find that around 70% of the shocks in the United States are 
smoothed through private and public risk-sharing mechanisms: financial markets play the 
biggest role, allowing around 60% of the total smoothing, while the federal fiscal policy 
covers the remaining 10%. More recently, Hepp and von Hagen (2013) find that for 
Germany, in the pre-unification period, most of the risk-sharing was provided by the federal 
tax-transfer and grant system (around 50%), while for the post-unification period this effect 
has significantly decreased.  
Box 3. Shocks, risk-sharing and consumption smoothing 
The economic literature on risk-sharing (on shock/market adjustment) distinguishes between 
market mechanisms and fiscal mechanisms: the former are self-financing, the latter require the use 
of public money. Moreover, correctly identifying the nature (permanent or transitory) of the shocks 
to be addressed is crucial for the effectiveness of the tool to be used.  
Risk-sharing relates to the idea of risk diversification in a context of different states of nature 
(good/bad) potentially affecting people’s welfare. Accordingly, people will act to protect their 
welfare against the risk of a bad state emerging. Individuals can guard against such risks by buying 
assets with payoffs that may be uncertain but in principle are unexpectedly high when bad lack 
does materialise elsewhere; hence a negative correlation between the payoffs is a key feature for 
diversification. Car and house insurance are common examples of this type of hedging. Financial 
assets, like stocks, bonds and derivatives, can play a similar role. In broad terms, (market) risk-
sharing requires access to international capital markets and occurs either through holding of a 
diversified portfolio of international assets or an explicit insurance. 
Consumption-smoothing posits a consumption choice on different dates; indeed it is an inter-
temporal concept according to which individuals (or countries) can maintain a steady level of 
consumption over time in the face of temporary shocks, which may result in fluctuations in income, 
which in turn, translate into fluctuations in consumption. The buffering of consumption against 
income shocks usually occurs through saving and borrowing in international credit markets. 
If one imagines a business cycle characterised by an average output gap of ±2%, complete 
smoothing would allow consumption expenditure to be completely independent from the business 
cycle, say at 100% of average income (and output). By contrast, in the absence of a smoothing tool, 
consumption would vary between 98% and 102% of the average income level. 
It should be specified that consumption can be smoothed (e.g. using savings or borrowing) if the 
shock is transitory. If a negative shock hits permanent income, consumption has to fall accordingly 
in a permanent fashion. Hence consumption smoothing renders consumption independent of 
current income, but not of permanent income. By contrast, risk-sharing makes it possible to keep 
consumption independent of permanent income, as it works as a hedge against possible adverse 
states of nature. The classical example is the one of home insurance against damages from fire. In 
the case of a fire destroying the house, the insurance repays its full value. Finally, while borrowing 
can be used as a tool to smooth consumption, it does not work as a loss absorption (if the risk 
materialises) mechanism, because loans have to be repaid with interest. A less classic but telling 
example is the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The Facility was designed to provide 
countries under emergency with funds to avoid abrupt adjustment in consumption (or even 
default) but resources had (have) to be repaid, augmented by interest. So there is no hedging 
against losses, which remain with the borrower.  
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4.1.1 The integration, disintegration and fragmentation of EMU banking systems 
The introduction of the Euro has certainly reduced barriers to financial integration and 
favoured greater capital flows between countries in the monetary union (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2006). The common payments infrastructure has reduced barriers to financial 
integration and credit flows via the wholesale interbank market have boosted financial 
integration. This was expected to facilitate risk-sharing among investors. Banks have been 
the primary financial intermediaries in the European Union and in the euro area. Most euro-
area member countries’ financial systems are heavily ’bank-centred’ and stock and bond 
markets provide a relatively modest share of the financing to their private sector. Total bank 
assets stood at €29.5 trillion at the end of 2012, almost 300% of EMU GDP, compared to about 
65% of GDP in the U.S (Fuceri and Zdzienicka, 2013).  
There is no robust evidence in the literature that such financial system, dominated by banks 
(rather than market) and debt (instead of equity) has increased the capacity of the economy 
for risk-sharing. 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010) and Demyank et al. (2007) find evidence that the increased cross-
banking integration triggered by the euro has fostered ex-post the optimality of the currency 
union by improving cross-country risk sharing. By contrast, Fuceri and Zdzienicka (2013) 
find that “the decrease in private credit smoothing after the creation of the EMU reflects the 
fact that credit flows have become less counter-cyclical”. 
In general, contrary to initial expectations, asymmetric shocks have not been rarer since the 
creation of the monetary unions (see Allard et al. 2001) nor has such a high degree of 
banking integration and its presumed ability to improve risk-sharing worked as an effective 
loss-absorption mechanism. 
Figure 15. Percentage change in intra-euro-area cross-border bank exposures (2010-12) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on IMF data, 2014. 
Figure 15 shows how the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis has revealed the fragilities of 
market integration: cross-border exposures towards peripheral countries dramatically 
collapsed, as banks based in the core economies started to withdraw their funds, leading to a 
sudden stop of those capital flows that had fuelled the operation of EMU in previous years. 
This led to a subsequent disintegration of EMU financial markets: holdings of cross-border 
securities diminished by more than 30% after reaching an historical peak in 2008, and claims 
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of EMU banks versus those of other EMU countries dropped by almost €1 trillion (Valiante, 
2014).  
This suggests that the supposed risk-sharing benefits from financial integration were in 
reality very low (or even negative) during the recent crisis period. This was especially the 
case for peripheral economies. A lesson learnt from this is that what matters for the resilience 
of the system to spillover effects originated by idiosyncratic shocks is not the level of gross 
financial integration per se, but the channels through which the financial flows are allocated 
and the composition of these flows. 
While cross-border banks’ exposure has grown rapidly since 1999, the equity integration in 
the banking markets remains low on average at the same level as 10 years ago. Figure 16 
compares the share of the domestic banking industry held by non-residents in the US and 
the euro area before the introduction of the euro and then before and after the peak of the 
crisis. The difference with the US is larger in 2011 than it was 15 years earlier.  
Figure 16. Shares of domestic MFIs held by non-residents, in the US and in the euro area 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on IMF data, 2013. 
In spite of attempts by the ECB to revitalise euro-area financial markets and restore their 
well-functioning by liquidity injection, the cross-border interbank flows and trust among 
EMU financial institutions dropped significantly relative to the period before the crisis.  
Moreover, as shown in Valiante (2014), the liquidity ring-fencing that EMU monetary and 
financial institutions undertook after the outbreak of the crisis further fragmented the 
financial system. National regulatory capital requirements, the functioning of the national 
resolution mechanisms as well as governance and political interference had negative effects 
on integration.  
National supervisory authorities, for instance, may have contributed to the fragmentation of 
markets, by requiring banks under their jurisdiction to reduce their cross-border exposure 
and establish a ‘buffer’ of capital and liquidity at national level. Although guided by the 
objective of increasing stability, these prescriptions contributed to financial dis-integration 
within EMU.  
Figure 17 provides some evidence of the increased home bias in the composition of monetary 
financial institutions’ balance sheets, resulting from the liquidity ring-fencing. This is 
particularly marked in the case of banks’ holdings of government debt securities:  during the 
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period 2007-14, a drop of more than €200 billion in the holdings of foreign public debt was 
more than offset by an increase of roughly €500 billion in holdings of domestic government 
securities (Valiante, 2014).  
Figure 17. MFIs holdings of non-domestic securities (other than shares) as % of total holdings by 
issuer (2007-14) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Valiante (2014). 
The reduction in cross-border holdings of sovereign bonds and the contraction in cross-
border bank loans, followed by the surge in banks' exposure to their domestic market, are 
the main manifestation of financial fragmentation. One consequence is that the differences in 
interest rates on loans applied by banks started to significantly diverge across Member 
States: credit became more expensive in the hardest-hit economies, especially for medium 
and small enterprises, which represent the main production fabric of the euro area’s 
peripheral economies. This has certainly contributed to delaying the economic recovery, 
giving rise to a vicious cycle in which balance sheets of otherwise-solvent borrowers 
deteriorate in the absence of credit, thus reinforcing pressures on banks’ balance sheets and 
the forces of fragmentation (Fuceri and Zdzienicka, 2013).  
There is some emerging evidence since 2014 that financial fragmentation is on a declining 
trend. In particular, differences in the funding costs of banks are reducing, but not 
translating into lower cost of credit for companies. This seems to suggest that financial 
fragmentation is no longer the main problem; instead, differences in macroeconomic and 
credit risks across Member States are responsible for persistent divergences.  
4.1.2 What to expect from the European banking union? 
Behind the fragmentation of financial markets lies the sovereign debt crisis and the strong 
interdependence between public debt and banks. On the one hand, European banks have 
always been heavily exposed to sovereign debt emissions. On the other hand, guarantees – 
even of an implicit nature – of the national governments in favour of domestic banks have 
created a strong link between the dynamics of sovereign states’ bonds and the cost of 
funding for banks in capital markets (IMF, 2012). Consequently, the heterogeneity in the 
conditions for credit in EMU increased as long as the conditions of the peripheral states 
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deteriorated, with obvious effects on the macroeconomic conditions of the peripheral 
countries.  
Two main policy responses to increasing fragmentation have been taken in the last four 
years. On the one hand, the ECB undertook a large set of non-standard monetary policies to 
increase the liquidity in financial markets and to restore monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms (Alcidi et al., 2012). Among others, the Long-Term Refinancing Operations 
(LTROs) and the launch of the Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) programme in 2012 
have certainly helped to avoid further financial market fragmentation. Since 2013, financial 
stability has gradually improved, especially in the sovereign debt markets. 
On the other hand, the decision to build a banking union has been specifically taken to break 
the banks-sovereign nexus. Two bricks have been laid so far (see Emerson and Giovannini, 
2013). The first is the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) under which the 
ECB becomes responsible for ensuring the supervision of the banking system.70 The second 
brick is represented by the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), a single mechanism for 
banks’ resolution with pooled resources at EU level.71  
It would be mistaken to believe that the banking union represents the solution to the real 
economy problems in the euro area. But with a banking union in place, EMU financial 
system should become less exposed to regional instability.  
To illustrate the importance of the banking union, it is useful to consider the thought 
experiment of how the housing bust in Ireland would have played out, had the SRM been 
fully in operation.72 First of all, with the SRM operating, when the local real estate boom 
turned into bust and several local banks became insolvent, the government would not have 
been involved in the rescue and the funding required to keep banks alive would have come 
from the Single Resolution Fund (SRF).73 The ECB would have flagged the banks in difficulty 
to the SRM. The latter would then have decided whether to allow the concerned banks to 
fail, to put them into resolution or to save them.  
Moreover, it is likely that the ECB would have recognised the existence of the housing price 
boom, and would have been more likely, than a local supervisor, to warn banks about 
excessive real-estate valuations, thus limiting the extent of the over-lending and 
construction. 
                                                   
70 The ECB will have to ensure the consistent application of the Single Rulebook and directly 
supervise banks either with assets worth more than €30 billion, or that constitute at least 20% of 
their home country's GDP, or that have requested or received direct public financial assistance 
from the ESM.  
71 The SRM will be fully operational in 2015 and provides a Single Resolution Fund (SRF), financed 
by the banks. The SRF will be created gradually over the course of eight years amounting in the 
end to €55 million. In the transitional phase, national resolution authorities will gradually transfer 
to the national compartments of the SRF the contributions raised at national level. Moreover, these 
national compartments will be gradually involved in the mutualisation in case of large banking 
resolutions (60% over the first two years and 6.7% in each of the remaining six years). 
72 The reason why Ireland is an interesting example is that in that case the nexus between banks and 
the sovereign became deadly tight. The Irish government reached the verge of default after 
offering blanket guarantees to banks liabilities.  
73 The Irish government would sustain costs only if domestic banks were allowed to go insolvent and 
the   losses were to be so large that the national deposit insurance scheme had to intervene in order 
to ensure that no holder of an insured retail deposit made a loss. 
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In principle, the potential losses of the SRF should have been lower than those incurred by 
the Irish government. The bail-in rules under the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive 
(BRRD) mandate that public funds can be provided only if shareholders as well as creditors 
have accepted a loss. This did not happen in the case of Ireland. At that time the entire euro-
area banking system was in difficulty and it was thought that letting any banks fail would 
have sparked another panic, comparable to the one that followed the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in the autumn of 2008. 
In case a bank is resolved, who holds the debt instruments that are bailed in is relevant. If 
they are preponderantly residents, i.e. local households and other local financial 
intermediaries, potentially important channels of local contagion are likely to exist. 
In addition to the role to be played in a crisis context, the creation of a banking union is key 
for restoring the market risk-sharing mechanisms and removing factors that contributed to 
or amplified financial markets fragmentation. 
Many cross-border banks (i.e. operating in more than one Member State) had to deal with 
different approaches and preferences of the different national supervisory authorities. 
National supervisors have a natural tendency to protect national champions, limiting de 
facto many cases of optimal cross-border mergers and acquisitions between banks.  
By transferring prudential bank supervision to the ECB through the SSM, this risk is greatly 
reduced. Cross-border equity investment in the banking sector should now become more 
frequent. This constitutes a further stabilising factor as the experience of the Baltic countries 
has shown (see Alcidi and Gros, 2014b).   
As the SRM will gradually take up its bank resolutions tasks, government interventions to 
save banks are expected to gradually disappear and, therefore, investors will have a sound 
basis on which to assess the health of a bank rather than indirectly relying on the state of 
health of the sovereign issuer. This should further spur financial integration, greater 
diversification in the composition of cross-border financial flows and contribute to breaking 
the nexus between banks and their sovereign. 
Overall, these three factors should improve the functioning of the monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms. Currently, the signal of historically low policy interest rates is 
poorly transmitted mainly to those Member States that need it most.  
4.1.3 Banking Union: Is it sufficient?  
A well-functioning banking union is crucial for the smooth functioning of EMU as it will 
overcome the difficulty banks encounter in obtaining cross-border information on borrowers 
or discounting the costs of different bankruptcy laws (Bignon at al., 2013). Also, it will 
promote better financial integration. However, the banking union project is far from being 
complete, as some relevant issues are still under discussion.  
First, while progress has been made in recent years for a more efficient protection of bank 
deposits (raising levels of coverage up to €100,000) and the harmonisation of the rules as well 
as the financing requirements (the target level for ex-ante funds of the Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes (DGS) is 0.8% of covered deposits), further efforts are still to be carried out to 
ensure effectiveness of national DGSs and improvement of operating DGSs’ rules in terms of 
speed of reimbursements, administrative simplification and funding. The drawback of this 
approach aiming at harmonising national DGSs rather than creating a Common European 
DGS is the risk that the banking union could be perceived by markets as a fragile creature, 
failing to eliminate the financial market fragmentation and falling short in the expectation of 
a return to a well-functioning monetary policy.  
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Secondly, it still lacks a solid central fund for the recapitalisation of banks. The current size of 
the SRF is relatively small compared to both the banks’ assets supervised by the SSM 
(approximately worth of €25,000 billion) and the overall capital of the sector (about €1,000 
billion). Moreover, how the SFR relates to the ESM is still unclear.  
Thirdly, the potential for some local channels of contagion from banks to the sovereign 
remains if the SRF lets a bank fail. In this case the national DGS fund would have to bear at 
least part of the financial burden (provided the losses are larger than the ‘bail-in-able’ capital 
of 8% of assets). Moreover, when the losses are very large relative to the balance sheet of the 
bank, there might be a direct conflict of interest between the SRF and the national DGS. 
Indeed a high contribution by the SRF to keep the bank in question afloat would translate 
into a lower risk of losses for the DGS. Against this risk, the SRF might have an interest in 
pushing national DGSs to contribute to any rescue operation, although the latter would have 
no legal obligation to do so as long as the bank is not formally insolvent.  
Fourthly, fragmentation along national borders is still high in the sovereign bond markets. 
The process of re-nationalisation of sovereign debt massively undertaken by domestic banks 
has even reinforced the perverse link between domestic banks and domestic sovereign debt. 
For example, in 2013, only 38% of Italian debt was held by foreign entities, a percentage 
considerably smaller than during the most acute period of the crisis. A similar consideration 
holds also for Spain (see Figure 18).  
Figure 18. Share of government securities held by resident and non-resident banks (% of GDP) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Banco de España and Banca d’Italia data. 
Finally, the availability of a solid central fund for the recapitalisation of banks in crisis is 
relevant also in consideration of the rising share of non-performing loans in Europe. PwC 
(2014) estimated that banks across Europe are still holding loan assets worth €2.4 trillion, 
which they regard as non-core or non-performing. Therefore, the pressure for further 
deleveraging in the EU banking system is unlikely to subside soon. In addition, the recent 
ECB stress test has shown that some large EU banks need to raise additional capital. A solid 
and well-functioning SRM is therefore a pre-requisite to avoid the risk of relapse and a 
resurgence of the financial crisis.  
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4.1.4 The quality of financial integration: The importance of equity market 
integration 
The process of financial market integration since the creation of EMU has been strong and 
rapid, but also uneven across markets. While it went farther in wholesale funding markets 
and bond markets, it was more limited in retail deposit, loan markets and, above all, equity 
markets (IMF, 2012).74 
The most prevalent form of cross-border financial market integration in EMU has been 
represented by government bonds, mainly intermediated by banks. This was indeed 
predicted by the economic theory, as the disappearance of the currency risk was expected to 
eliminate major discrepancies between bonds issued by EMU governments with similar 
credit ratings. Under the hypothesis of equal inflation rates resulting from a single monetary 
policy (a hypothesis that in reality did not materialise) and sound fiscal positions, 
guaranteed by the SGP, macroeconomic fundamentals across the economies were expected 
to converge as well as the risk associated with government bonds, hence creating a similar 
risk-free asset for all euro-area residents (Adjaouté and Danthine, 2002).  
Theory also correctly predicted a limited impact on equity markets from the single currency. 
The first reason for this was the historically low currency component in euro-area equity 
returns. The second is more articulated and has to do with the impact of EMU on economic 
and financial convergence. On the one hand, EMU institutional architecture was expected to 
exert a common pressure towards convergence of key macroeconomic variables, with a 
consequent effect on the dispersion of firms’ profits and wages. On the other hand, the 
higher specialisation resulting from lower barriers to trade in both goods and financial 
products was likely to affect the equity-risk premium and the cost of equity capital, possibly 
leading to more heterogeneity. 
It is difficult to empirically assess the impact of the single currency on equity markets’ 
returns, as equity returns are not directly comparable as bond yields. Cappiello et al. (2006) 
document an overall increase in co-movements in the EU equity markets. However, 
correlations for equity markets are much lower than for bond markets and the documented 
small increase in the co-movement in equity markets is limited to large euro-area economies 
only. This suggests weak integration. More recently, Bekaert et al. (2013), using a large panel 
data set of bilateral measures of equity market segmentation, document both a reduced 
equity market segmentation across member countries after joining the EU and a relatively 
small integration effect on equity markets resulting from the euro adoption. 
The extent to which the former influence dominates the latter largely depends on the extent 
to which the arbitrage opportunities of the financial integration would have been seized by 
market participants. The data on equity diversification in the first decade of EMU offer weak 
evidence of changes similar to those that occurred in the debt market since the inception of 
the euro. 
Figure 19 shows that the percentage of euro-area investment funds’ cross-border holdings of 
equity issued in other euro-area countries has not dramatically changed since 2000. It is also 
                                                   
74 Before going further in the discussion, it is worth to remind that bonds and equities, are both 
financial assets, but their characteristics are very different. Bonds give the bond holder the right to 
be repaid and to receive interest until repayment, in exchange for providing funding to the issuer 
of the bond. Conversely, a shareholder owns a bundle of rights, some economic, e.g. dividends, 
others governance-related, i.e. voting rights.  
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worth noting that in this case a prominent role has been played by EMU banks: at end 2007, 
about 25% of equity holdings of euro-area banks were in other European countries. 
Figure 19. Investment funds’ holdings of equity issued in other euro-area countries and the rest of the 
world (% of the total) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ECB data, 2014. 
The degree of cross-border ownership of equities in the euro area is significantly lower than 
would be expected in a fully integrated market, in which investors spread their investments 
across the entire euro area to reap the benefits of diversification (ECB, 2014). This has 
reduced the ability of investors to achieve full diversification and hence negatively affected 
the capacity to smooth income and consumption.  
Kose et al. (2007) find that an increase in foreign equity holdings equal to 100% of GDP with 
no accompanying change in debt openness would lead to a 12% decrease in the dependence 
of idiosyncratic (i.e. country-specific) shocks to consumption from idiosyncratic shocks to 
gross output. Corcoran (2008) suggests that the smoothing-out effect can be as high as 96%.  
The differences between debt and equity instruments have been a specific feature of financial 
integration in the EU before the crisis. However, most recent data suggest that the situation 
is gradually changing. Since the onset of the crisis, equity-market performance has exhibited 
a lower degree of cross-country heterogeneity than that of bond markets. While the euro-
area sovereign bond markets experienced severe tensions and a significant degree of 
segmentation, equity markets demonstrated a higher resilience. 
Figure 20 provides evidence of the higher resilience of equity markets vis-à-vis debt markets 
by looking at changes in the exposure of EMU core-economies towards peripheral countries 
during the financial crisis. The exposure through debt securities (mainly intermediated by 
the banking sector) collapsed, recording a reduction of 28% during the period 2007-10 and a 
further retrenchment of 25% between 2010 and 2013. By contrast, the fall in the exposure 
through equities has been more limited, 3% between 2007 and 2010, and an additional 13% 
between 2010 and 2013. 
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Figure 20. Percentage changes in exposure of EMU core-economies towards peripheral countries 
 
Note: Core economies: Austria, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Peripheral countries: Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on IMF data, 2014. 
Therefore, as a complement to banking union, it is key to promote a more genuine and 
complete financial integration by increasing direct cross-border equity ownership. This 
would help remove the kind of integration, mostly through bank intermediation, that 
exacerbated the boom and bust cycles in peripheral economies.  
This integration process is actually starting to take place: the observed fall in share prices and 
labour costs in peripheral economies are creating investment opportunities attractive for core 
country companies and investors. Core countries’ equity exposure vis-à-vis peripheral 
countries increased by 5% over the period 2012-13 (i.e. after the peak of the sovereign debt 
crisis), whereas it fell by 3% vis-à-vis other core countries.  
However, rebalancing portfolios towards equity investments requires public support and 
decisive legislative action. There are factors related to the specific economic and market 
situations in individual Member States which significantly hinder such developments.  
Despite the difficulty in tackling country-specific differences, there is large room for 
manoeuvre in removing legal and regulatory obstacles that underpin the fragmentation of 
equity markets across EU jurisdictions. The ECB (2014) recognises that, in addition to the 
legal aspects related to the life cycle of securities, capital markets remain underdeveloped as 
a result of insufficiently harmonised corporate governance rules. Due to their governance 
features, equities are more closely linked to the legal system under which the issuer is 
regulated and this varies significantly across Member States due partly also to different 
national taxation regimes and other factors, such as different legal frameworks for crisis 
management and insolvency. 
Important technical limitations, such as the lack of an integrated European market 
infrastructure, add to problems related to the legal frameworks. More than a decade ago, the 
Giovannini report (2001) identified 15 barriers to integration of cross-border clearing and 
settlement, but many of them are still there and it is still unclear when and how these issues 
will be addressed. 
A systemic revolution, similar to that taking place in the banking sector through the banking 
union, would be needed in the field of capital markets. The establishment of a European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has been an important step in the right direction of 
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a more harmonised framework in the supervisory field. But the national competent 
authorities still have large discretion in the enforcement in the application of supervisory 
standards. 
By defining a more homogenous set of rules at EMU level and by establishing a central 
supervisor for capital markets, investors would have a better basis and rules to assess the 
risk of the issuer and firms would be able to more easily increase capital by issuing equity to 
investors across borders. 
 Internalising EMU externalities: Fiscal risk-sharing mechanisms   
The crisis has revealed the inability, especially at EMU level, to efficiently deal with 
asymmetric shocks. These inefficiencies have contributed to reinvigorate, after long years of 
absence, the debate about the possibility of creating a common budget to deal with 
asymmetric shocks, similar to that adopted in the United States and in other federal states. 
The impact of adverse regional or state macroeconomic shocks can be absorbed or mitigated 
by resorting to a central fiscal mechanism. This represents a natural fiscal counterpart to 
monetary policy, with the latter being tasked for price stability at the aggregate level, but it 
does not necessarily imply fiscal union. 
In the EU context, these considerations become particularly evident in an historical 
perspective. The first failed attempt to form a monetary union in 1970 (the Werner Plan and 
the European ‘currency snake’) was criticised retroactively on the grounds of its exclusive 
reliance on monetary mechanisms and the absence of an adequate common fiscal system. 
This is certainly not surprising if one compares the EU governance architecture with 
monetary unions of other developed economies. In the United States, Canada and Germany, 
monetary union is supported by a joint federal budget accounting for about 20-25% of GDP, 
with important functions of macroeconomic stabilisation and inter-regional redistribution. 
On average, between one-half and two-thirds of the initial macroeconomic shock is absorbed 
by the federal budget.  
In the case of EMU, the view at the time of its creation was that a centralised fiscal institution 
to assure the smooth functioning of EMU would have emerged later, when the need would 
become evident. The current debate is therefore completely split between what would be 
desirable and what is in practice politically achievable in an endless discussion strongly 
influenced by internal tensions between debtor and creditor countries in the core and 
periphery.  
However, some steps have been registered in this field and some changes in this direction 
can be partially discerned on the horizon. The lack of a common budget for the euro area 
became a major concern and the need for some elements of fiscal union started being 
recognised. 
The Van Rompuy report (Van Rompuy, 2012) foresees in the third stage of reforms towards a 
Genuine Economic and Monetary Union (i.e. after 2014), the creation of a limited ‘fiscal 
capacity’ at the central level to strengthen the ability of EMU to withstand shocks. This 
‘capacity’ should be used to facilitate adjustment by individual countries to asymmetric 
shocks and may take the form of a system of mutual insurance between Member States 
where the contributions and disbursements would vary according to the position of 
individual countries with respect to the business cycle. In the future, the resources required 
for the financing of this scheme may be supplemented by own resources from a common 
budget or by borrowing on the market.  
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The Communication of the European Commission for a deeper and genuine EMU (European 
Commission, 2012a) also considers the issue of the fiscal capacity and elaborates further on 
some of the elements contained in the Van Rompuy report. In the context of enhanced EMU 
fiscal capacity as a counter-cyclical tool, the document advocates the issuance of euro bills by 
a central authority and to progressively replace the bonds issued by individual countries. A 
European Treasury Department attached to the Commission would represent the central 
element of a future ‘fiscal union’ with the task of managing the fiscal capacity and common 
issues of debt securities. Most of these key elements are missing in the Van Rompuy report, 
which prefers a rather vague formulation, likely to avoid vetoes in the European Council. 
There is, however, need and urgency to clarify the content and scope of a fiscal union. The 
difference of stance described in the two documents and the lack of progress shows that 
political backing for an EMU (additional) fiscal capacity remains elusive. 
The Van Rompuy Report was instrumental to spur the academic and policy debate on how 
to complement the monetary union with a fiscal union (see for instance Fuest and Peichl, 
2012; Fuceri and Zdzienicka, 2013; Gros, 2013b; Pickford et al., 2014). 
Admittedly, views on the contours of the fiscal union still differ across EMU members. There 
is a need to make progress on important specific elements of a fiscal union, in particular on 
the content and limits of debt mutualisation as well as forms of solidarity among countries.  
The next section represents a first step along this path, by discussing why a common fiscal 
capacity would be beneficial for EMU and how it could be built in the medium run, by the 
creation of a supranational fiscal risk-sharing mechanism, like an unemployment insurance 
scheme. 
4.2.1 Why does EMU need a fiscal capacity tool?  
In a monetary union, the key task of monetary policy is to preserve price stability, while the 
main burden to stabilise the economy is left to fiscal policy. In principle, governments can 
achieve the goal of stabilisation using (exclusively or by mixing them properly) at least two 
types of fiscal policy instruments: either as inter-temporal transfers within a certain region or 
country or as inter-regional transfers. The choice between the two instruments, however, 
depends largely on the type of fiscal regime adopted at supranational level. Indeed while the 
first implies the adoption of national measures, the second requires the establishment of a 
centralised EMU budget.  
So far, in the absence of a centralised fiscal policy, the Member States have responded to 
asymmetric shocks in an autonomous way through their fiscal balance, i.e. by increasing the 
deficit via the automatic stabilisers (revenues, social spending, etc.) according to the 
contingent needs. This solution, however, may generate (and has indeed generated, as the 
crisis has shown) problems related to the sustainability of the deficit, leading to a continuous 
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio and, therefore, of the risk of insolvency. 
In light of the above considerations (and of the experience of the crisis), the traditional theory 
of the optimum currency area (OCA) suggests centralising a portion of national budgets, in 
order to allow fiscal policies to redistribute aggregate demand through transfers between 
countries hit by different shocks. Temporary shocks can be stabilised through automatic 
transfers; conversely, permanent shocks require structural interventions that are able to 
affect the prices of the factors and hence their mobility. 
The role of fiscal instruments was advocated already in the MacDougall report in the 1970s 
and Majocchi and Rey (1993) had proposed the creation of a “conjunctural convergence 
facility” to mitigate asymmetric shocks by a common fiscal instrument in the 1990s. Such a 
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system was not designed to operate automatically. It had to be triggered by a common 
evaluation of Member States about the effective idiosyncratic causes of the shocks. 
More recently, Farhi and Werning (2013) show, using a theoretical framework, that under 
incomplete markets where macro-insurance markets are imperfect or non-existent (i.e. are 
not able to provide a full risk-sharing for certain states of the nature), a role emerges for 
government intervention. They prove that the establishment of contingent transfers within a 
ﬁscal union increases the overall welfare of its Member States. Indeed, an efficient insurance 
arrangement can be implemented through ex-post fiscal transfers or ‘bailouts’ that are 
contingent on the shocks experienced by a certain country. Moreover, the bigger (and more 
persistent) the asymmetric shock, the greater are the welfare gains. Interestingly, they 
demonstrate the beneficial role of fiscal transfers also under the hypothesis of complete 
ﬁnancial markets, as private insurance is inefﬁciently low.  
EMU currently lacks such an instrument of common fiscal policy. There have been some 
innovations in the financial rescue mechanisms devised to avoid contagion in case of 
sovereigns under emergency conditions, such as the EFSF and later the ESM. Nevertheless, 
these are instruments for crisis management which take the form of loans rather than 
transfers. In other words they do not work as tools for risk or burden-sharing in response to 
shocks. An absolute blockage over the creation of a fiscal union with a budget of a proper 
size for both expenditures and taxation remains.  
Fuceri and Zdzienicka (2013) emphasise that the answers provided by ex-post stabilisation 
fiscal policies are more expensive and less efficient than ex-ante, preventive measures. The 
experience of the so-called bottom ‘save states’ is an example. To finance the EFSF first, and 
the ESM later, about €700 billion, equivalent to 7.5% of GDP of the euro area, had to be 
mobilised. To these, must be added the social and economic costs of unemployment, lack of 
growth and loss of human capital. Early intervention of anti-shock fiscal policies would have 
had a lower cost on all European economies. The IMF estimates that, had the euro-area 
countries pooled a share of their GDP on the order of 1.5%-2.5% to finance an insurance 
fund, the negative effects of the crisis could have been reduced by up to four-fifths.  
Before going forward, it is important to clarify the type of fiscal capacity we are referring to. 
Fiscal policy is generally defined as the power to tax citizens and centralise government 
spending (welfare, pensions, infrastructure, education, etc.). Such a mechanism would not be 
applicable today in Europe. A full federal fiscal policy would require a permanent transfer of 
powers and resources from national governments to the European institutions. The budget 
constraints for national states would be even greater and spending decisions would be taken 
in Brussels. At the moment, there is neither consensus nor the political institutions that 
would be necessary for a transfer of power of this magnitude. 
What EMU needs is an intermediate and realistic model. It needs fiscal capacity in the form 
of a shock-absorbing mechanism that reduces the economic and social costs of the 
convergence process. The tools that already exist, such as the European Structural Funds, 
cannot be considered as a true fiscal instrument for absorbing shock. Their target is territorial 
as they aim to help the poorer regions to adapt to the competition created by the single 
market. What EMU needs is a fiscal mechanism that may stabilise idiosyncratic shocks 
through simple transfers to those Member States most severely hit, that is, cash payments 
(generated by a federal tax system or by contribution of the Member States) intended to 
stabilise the current available income.  
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4.2.2 A shock-absorbing mechanism: The case of the European unemployment 
insurance scheme 
Following the Van Rompuy report (2012), the debate around the concept of shock-absorbing 
mechanisms has significantly increased. One of the most concrete examples of such a 
mechanism currently under debate is the European Unemployment Insurance (EUI) scheme. 
The existence of a supranational unemployment scheme is indeed a common feature of 
many monetary unions (for the sake of comparison, Box 4 describes the current US system of 
unemployment insurance).  
Box 4. The US system of unemployment insurance: The US federal unemployment compensation 
scheme 
In the United States, unemployment insurance provides benefits to those workers who have lost 
their jobs not through their own fault. Each state has its own unemployment system, administrated 
under the supervision of the Federal government. To be eligible to receive benefits, workers must: i) 
have earned a certain minimum amount before the loss of their job; ii) must be prepared, available 
and able to work; and iii) must be looking to work and be able to prove their efforts to find a job.  
Unemployment insurance in the US is fully financed by contributions paid by the employers, 
contrary to practice in most European countries. Employers pay the state two different types of 
contributions to the unemployment insurance scheme:  
 The federal law on taxes for unemployment (Federal Unemployment Tax Act, FUTA), is 
responsible: i) for the administration of the programme at the federal and state level; ii) for the 
federal extensions related to unemployment benefits; and iii) for granting extra loans to states. 
The FUTA contribution rate is the same for all employers and the tax rate for employers 
amounts to around 6% of labour costs. 
 The unemployment insurance scheme of the states (State Unemployment Tax Acts, SUTA)*, are 
responsible for administering the standard unemployment benefits at the state level. The 
contribution is mainly based on the number of employees that an employer has terminated (i.e. 
firms that fire more employees also pay more) and, secondly, the financial soundness of the 
Trust Fund unemployment insurance (Unemployment Insurance Trust Fund). The employers 
complying with the state contributions receive a FUTA credit, even if such credit may be 
reduced if the state has federal loans in arrears or if the state does not follow the rules set at 
federal level (see below).  
Three main characteristics of the federal-state relationship in administering unemployment 
insurance schemes are worth noting: 
 The system is administered at federal level by the US Department of Labour, which sets broad 
rules that state programmes must follow (categories of workers to be covered, the functioning 
of the Extended Benefit programmes, the maximum state unemployment tax rate to be imposed 
on employers).  
 States can get loans from the Federal Unemployment Account if they run low on funds, but the 
deficit needs to be cleared in the long run. 
 The system centralises part of the organisation at the federal level but still allows each state the 
possibility to personalise certain features and requirements.  
* The rate of contribution varies across states and according to the type of firm, years of activity and other 
parameters. Hence no single number would fully summarise the scheme.   
This is not a novelty in the academic and political debate. Already during the initial phases 
of the establishment of EMU, the idea of creating of such a system was discussed. Table 5 
summarises the main proposals that have been brought forward since the design of EMU.  
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Table 5. The different proposals for a European unemployment insurance scheme 
AUTHORS KEY PARAMETERS FUNCTIONING 
STRICTLY DEFINED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SCHEMES 
Majocchi and 
Rey (1993) 
Dependent on the evaluation of 
Member States to rule out 
idiosyncratic causes unrelated to 
external shocks 
- Provides loans and grants to the struggling state to 
pay benefits or invest, in employment schemes 
Italianer and 
Vanheukelen 
(1993) 
National deviations in the annual 
change of the unemployment rate 
from the EMU average 
- System of direct payments to the Member States, 
which will have the freedom to decide how to spend 
those funds 
Mélitz and 
Vori (1993) 
Income per capita or unemployment 
rate deviations compared to average 
sum of the deviations in the EU 
- By-product of an enlarged union budget and in the 
context of an extended "European solidarity" 
Bajo-Rubio 
and Diaz-
Roldan (2000) 
Drop in the unemployment rate, 
compared to the preceding 12 months 
- Each country pays around 1% of tax revenues into 
a common budget that then redistributes these funds 
to the beneficiary countries 
- Functions on a monthly basis 
- In action if at least one country is experiencing a 
drop in its unemployment 
Jara H.X et al. 
(2013) 
 - Sets a minimum standard for the Member States, 
which could, in severe cases of crisis, be 
complemented with supplements and extension 
- National channels for raising contributions 
/distributing the benefits by / to employers or 
employees 
Delpla (2012)  - Supplement to national schemes 
- Financed by an annual contribution equal to 1% of 
GDP by each Member States and only if the 
European Labour Contract were adhered to 
- Benefit would be conferred only if the sum of 
national and euro-area benefits did not exceed a 
maximum threshold 
Dullien (2007, 
2012, 2013 
 - All employees in EMU are insured; they contribute 
a share of their wages up to a certain threshold, 
linked to each country’s average income 
- Average insured wage is 80% of the average wage 
in each country 
- Replacement payment is 50% of the insured wage 
- Over the cycle, contributions to the scheme cover 
all pay-outs 
- Unemployment benefits are paid for 12 months 
- Unemployment insurance can build up reserves 
and borrow in the capital market 
- Possibility for each Member State to continue to 
offer additional national services/benefits on top of 
the supranational coverage 
Pisani-Ferry 
et al. (2013) 
 
A set base value (1.5% of GDP) plus a 
factor of the deviation of the 
individual unemployment rate from 
the euro area average 
- Financed by a corporate income tax applied to the 
whole euro area 
- Euro area-wide applied corporate tax rate of 12.6% 
- Unemployment insurance scheme of about 1.8% of 
euro-area GDP 
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de 
Crombrugghe 
(2014) 
n‐year moving average of the actual 
unemployment 
benefit expenditure 
- Funds the current unemployment expenditure of 
the member countries 
- Charges them on the basis of a backward-moving 
average of their past expenditure 
- In case of correlated shocks, temporary imbalances 
would require a common borrowing and lending 
capacity 
INSURANCE SCHEMES SIMILAR TO THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SCHEME 
 Hammond 
and von 
Hagen (1995) 
GDP fluctuations from the economies 
long-term equilibrium path 
- The whole amount collected should always be 
distributed;  
- It should compensate a great part of the relevant 
shocks;  
- It should guarantee Union budget neutrality.  
Enderlein et 
al. (2013) 
Output gap as a main trigger, which 
could be complemented with 
indicators such as inflation rates and 
short-term (cyclical) unemployment 
- Cyclical adjustment insurance fund (CAIF); 
- Payments would need to be calculated as part of an 
early autumn forecast so that national budgetary 
processes would still be able to factor in CSI 
payments;  
- Definition of a common rulebook for domestic 
stabilization. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Although there are differences with respect to how the mechanisms work, certain elements 
such as the key parameters used and ways of identifying the ‘asymmetry’ of the shock 
emerge as common to all proposals.  
First, the EUI scheme should act as a shock absorber to cushion mainly asymmetric shocks to 
the economy, and thus overcome coordination failures and individual countries’ budget 
constraints.  
Secondly, most of these systems are conceived as an insurance system and not as an 
automatic direct transfer of resources from one country to another. Accordingly, the funds 
are designed in such a way that individual countries take turns acting both as taxpayers and 
beneficiaries, depending on their position over the economic cycle. Therefore, from the 
perspective of the individual country, the net cost would be zero in the medium term, while 
the benefits in terms of reduction of economic shocks would be positive for all states. Other 
systems, instead, foresee a single tax base for all the Member States: in this case, national 
boundaries are not significant, as the contributors are not the states, but directly the 
employers/employees on which direct taxes are levied.  
Despite these similarities, differences exist among the proposals. Following the work of Gros 
et al. (2014), it is possible to provide a synthesis of the pros and cons of the different 
approaches.  
The most important difference among the various proposals is the indicator that triggers the 
insurance scheme. The EUI could either be applied following a ‘business as usual’ approach 
(i.e. to be activated whenever a worker becomes unemployed for a given number of weeks) 
or be activated only in exceptional circumstances (i.e. when public finances are put under 
stress by a larger demand for unemployment benefits). In this second case, it would need the 
adoption of a reference set of indicators that could capture the exceptionality of the economic 
shock. 
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Table 6 summaries the trade-offs between the two main indicators, behind the two different 
approaches, discussed in the literature, namely the short-term unemployment rate and the 
unemployment gap.  
It appears that the latter indicator, despite the difficulty of setting a discretionary benchmark 
of what constitutes an ’emergency level’ of unemployment, is better able to capture the 
impact of the shock. It therefore provides a solid basis for a ‘catastrophic insurance’ EUI 
model; conversely, short-term unemployment appears to be more appropriate for a 
’harmonised system’, as it is directly linked to the number of unemployed workers entitled 
to receive an income-support benefit.   
Table 6. Indicators to trigger EUI, pros and cons  
Indicator to trigger EUI Pros Cons 
Short-term 
unemployment rate  
Clear and unambiguous, 
fast response to shock 
Higher variability across European 
countries 
Unemployment gap Better captures longer-term impact of the shock 
Ex-post revisions, difficulty in setting up 
benchmark 
Note: See Gros et al. (2014) for an extensive discussion of the main characteristics of the two indicators.  
Source: Gros et al. (2014). 
A further characteristic along which some of the proposals differ is the way through which 
the Member States’ contributions are regulated. Some of the proposals foresee the 
requirement that expenditures should be balanced on an annual basis, others require a 
substantial balance over the cycle or a system that is able to treat a country that is in 
persistent deficit vis-à-vis the system. Table 7 summarises the pros and cons for three 
options.  
The first one is an unemployment benefit scheme that is balanced annually, that is whatever 
is collected during the year is redistributed across countries during the same year. From the 
one hand, it avoids the problems related to the capacity of the EUI to borrow in case of 
deficit. On the other hand, it would create relevant technical and practical complications, as 
it would require a permanent calibration of the system on an annual basis, leading to 
unpredictability and uncertainty at the national level. 
The second possibility is the absence of any fiscal rule governing the 
disbursements/payments of the EUI. It would ensure the greatest flexibility to deal with 
a variety and different combinations of (symmetric and asymmetric) shocks, but at the same 
time, it would hardly be considered politically acceptable as it would establish an open-
ended commitment. 
The final possibility consists of establishing a system that would be balanced, but only over 
the economic cycle. In other words, the fund would be able to run surpluses annually, but 
would need a fiscal balance over the medium term. Rebalancing could occur via an 
automatic increase in each country’s contribution after a certain number of years of deficit, or 
by automatically limiting EUI transfers after a certain period of time. This system would be 
similar to that currently operating in the US (previously explained in Box 4), where states can 
borrow from the federal account if needed, or the federal system is authorised to increase the 
employers’ contribution for that state in order to accelerate the speed of the rebalancing path. 
This option, even though more complex, represents a good balance between the need for a 
system that is counter-cyclical and the risk of redistributing towards countries with 
structurally higher levels and rates of unemployment. 
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Table 7. A fiscal framework for the EUI, pros and cons  
Fiscal framework Pros Cons 
Annual balance Simplicity, no need to deal with 
borrowing capacity 
Unable to respond to the frequent 
combination of symmetric and 
asymmetric shocks, consequently likely 
to provide the least support when most 
needed 
No fiscal rule Simplicity and strongly anti-
cyclical, especially in sustained 
downturns 
Open-ended commitment for Member 
States – difficult both politically and 
technically 
Balanced over the 
economic cycle 
A combination of countercyclical 
policy with constraints on the 
overall cost and contribution 
Technically more complex than the other 
two options 
Note: See Gros et al. (2014) for an extensive discussion on the main characteristics of the three possible indicators. 
Source: Gros et al. (2014). 
The final difference among the different proposals is the definition of common EU standards 
for the unemployment benefits disbursed under the EUI. Although automatic stabilisers 
exist in all EU countries, large differences exist, for example, in terms of generosity and 
coverage ratios. 
To overcome this situation and to let the EUI to operate in the same way in all the Member 
States, two (not necessarily perfect substitutes) instruments are possible: harmonisation 
through the definition of common European standards for the unemployment benefits, and 
imposing a conditionality in the use of funds under the EUI. Table 8 summarises the pros 
and cons of the two approaches. 
Harmonisation would appear the most natural and simple way. It could be achieved de jure, 
by the definition of a regulation on minimum standards for unemployment benefits, or de 
facto by setting up a unified European benefit system partially or completely replacing 
national systems. Either way, common standards would need to be agreed upon for the key 
dimensions of unemployment insurance: coverage rates, replacement ratios, duration and 
eligibility. Nevertheless, this way would present significant challenges, as the current 
national systems heavily differ and it would not be easy to alter national equilibria reached 
in the past.  
With respect to conditionality, the possibility for the supranational authority to have a say on 
how common funds are used is an open question. If on the one hand, it would help more 
reluctant countries to accept the creation of a common system; on the other hand, it is not 
easy to define the legitimacy of a supranational authority imposing the implementation of 
labour market and welfare reforms.   
Table 8. Standards and conditionality applicable to the EUI 
Procedures Pros Cons 
Common European 
unemployment 
benefits standards 
Clarity 
Strong signal of Social Europe for 
citizens 
Requires politically challenging 
unification 
Provides less scope for incorporating 
national preferences 
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Conditionality Strong anti-cyclical impact 
guaranteed 
Higher political/social support 
Alternative uses by national government 
might be more efficient 
Can create imbalances in 
generosity/coverage between the 
European system and other national 
parts of a benefit system 
Note: See Gros et al. (2014) for an extensive discussion on the main characteristics of the two elements.  
Source: Gros et al. (2014). 
Finally, it is also important to stress how, from a political and social point of view, the 
creation of a EUI scheme could also demonstrate European cohesion in a visible and tangible 
way to European citizens, by introducing a mechanism for permanent/long-term solidarity 
across EMU and by setting common standards for unemployment supports within the euro 
area. 
Overall, while far from the idea of full fiscal union, a common fiscal capacity with a very 
specific use, such as the unemployment insurance scheme, could deliver important 
improvements in the function of EMU and hence increase its output legitimacy. While it will 
continue to fuel a large debate, it is politically possible and sensible. Unemployment 
represents one of the key policy areas where EU action, as opposed to country-level action, 
can be more effective in response to spillover effects, at least under certain circumstances.  
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Conclusions 
The democratic legitimacy of a polity, institution or policy decision refers not only to its 
legality but also to its acceptance by citizens and its conformity with democratic principles 
and common values. Executive powers transferred to the EU level to solve the euro crisis 
and with the objective of improving the functioning of EMU have reduced Member States’ 
discretion in key policy areas, but they have not been accompanied by corresponding 
mechanisms to ensure political accountability. As a result, the democratic credentials of the 
economic governance of EMU have been called into question and citizens’ disaffection with 
the EU has increased.   
Legitimacy can be assessed both in its output and input dimensions. In general, output 
legitimacy rests on the ability to deliver results and solve problems. In the context of EMU, it 
rests on its ability to deal effectively with functional externalities. Conversely, input 
legitimacy relates to the participation of citizens, mainly but not exclusively through the 
election of their representatives and the capacity to hold those elected officials accountable.  
Shortcomings in the output legitimacy of EMU have been exposed by the crisis and its 
incapacity to mitigate the adverse effects. Shortcomings in the input legitimacy of EMU 
governance have their origin in the initial conception of the project itself, which gave priority 
to the delivery of results over democracy, but these have been exacerbated by the recent 
changes.   
The institution of a fully-fledged political union with fiscal capacity would not only help to 
overcome these two shortcomings, it would also reduce the system’s vulnerability to 
citizens’ disapproval. As is the case at the national level, citizens’ support would then 
revolve around specific policies and actions rather than questioning membership and the 
whole structure itself.  
A federal approach, however, is nowhere close on the near horizon. Nor is it at all clear that 
EU citizens will ever accept such a solution.  
With these caveats in mind, this study has examined feasible ways to balance the 
technocratic and executive character of EMU by increasing its accountability and creating 
conditions for EMU to be able to deal with its functional externalities so as to improve both 
its input and output legitimacy. With this purpose in mind, the study first assesses the 
degree of legitimacy, both input- and output-oriented, of the current system of governance of 
the EMU. The changes in recent years, which have tried to manage the effect of the crisis and 
to overcome the limits of the previous governance structure made evident by the crisis, led to 
the design of a governance system focused on fixing problems through ad-hoc solutions 
without attempting to make it either transparent, accountable or fully legitimate.  
At a minimum, the EU can coordinate and supervise the Member States’ fiscal and 
macroeconomic policies, but it can also enforce corrective actions and subject a country to 
enhanced surveillance and a macroeconomic adjustment programme. The role of the EU 
institutions is different in each particular situation, but broadly speaking, the European 
Commission has played a central role in the assessment of Member States’ performance, the 
surveillance of national policies and the establishment of corrective actions, all of which 
usually require the intervention in varying degrees or the approval of the Council. The role 
of the ECB is relevant in the case of the adjustment programmes. These decisions have an 
impact on the tax and spending policies of Member States and on the living standards of EU 
citizens, but it is very difficult for citizens to hold those responsible for adopting the 
ENHANCING THE LEGITIMACY OF EMU GOVERNANCE | 77 
 
decisions accountable, given the limited role of the EP and the national parliaments in the 
process and the relative and diffuse responsibility of their representatives in the Council.  
In terms of output legitimacy, which is assessed on the basis of the ability to reduce the risk 
that idiosyncratic shocks will spill over into other countries in the form of negative 
externalities and to mitigate such negative effects, it is far from clear that this compensates 
for shortcomings in the input legitimacy. There is no clear-cut evidence of an improved 
ability of EMU to deal with spillovers under any of the specific circumstances that could 
arise within the new governance system. Admittedly, this may be influenced by the fact that 
the crisis is not yet over and the current low economic performance inevitably weighs on the 
judgement of whether EMU is able to deal with the problem. Moreover, the ability of the 
system to reduce the likelihood of future crises, which is the main rationale of the new 
governance system, cannot yet be tested (assuming that this can be done). 
Overall the main finding of the assessment is that EU constraints on the exercise of national 
discretion tend to increase with the risk of (larger) spillovers. When such risk increases, the 
intrusiveness of the EU increases and input legitimacy tends to weaken.  
While this reflects the approach often applied by nation states, and one that is usually 
accepted, it raises important legitimacy problems for the EU level where the executive is not 
fully accountable to the general electorate. This has resulted in tensions arising between the 
EU institutions and between the EU and the national levels.  
The second finding is that a lower input legitimacy is not necessarily offset by higher output 
legitimacy. The expectation that stricter intrusion should lead to better capacity to deal with 
externalities is not yet supported by robust evidence. 
The third finding is that a rule-based system and the attempt to de-politicise EU decisions 
suffer from serious limitations. When a country moves into conditions of stress and crisis, as 
the rule-based system is failing in achieving its objective to prevent externalities from 
happening, decisions of a political nature become inevitable. For those decisions, due 
accountability must be ensured.  
The study then explored the possibility for improvements in economic governance of EMU, 
concluding that changes are required on two levels – institutional and economic. The input-
oriented legitimacy of EMU can be improved by strengthening the involvement of the EP in 
the European Semester and in the scrutiny of the macroeconomic adjustment programmes, 
as well as by improving parliamentary oversight of the European Council and the 
Eurogroup and, where appropriate, the ECB. In order to do so, the EP needs to be endowed 
with the necessary resources and to undergo an upgrade in its organisational structures. The 
creation of a subcommittee of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the 
parliamentary oversight of EMU decisions would contribute to this purpose and allow for a 
more effective format of inter-parliamentary cooperation with (and among) the national 
parliaments of the euro-area countries.  
The other kind of changes relate to economic mechanisms that could improve the 
functioning of EMU by increasing its ability to either reduce the emergence of negative 
externalities or mitigate their impact. For this purpose, financial integration matters as a tool 
of market risk-sharing and a fiscal capacity for EMU matters as a tool of fiscal risk-sharing.   
Well-functioning market-sharing mechanisms (which do not require pooling public money) 
should be complemented by common fiscal instruments to absorb and mitigate the effects of 
negative externalities emerging from shocks. A common EMU insurance against 
idiosyncratic shocks can represent the starting point for more complex policy instruments, as 
found in other successful monetary unions.  
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Such mechanisms, both market-based and fiscal, can contribute to reduce the risk that 
negative externalities will trigger large crises that pose serious risk to the output-oriented 
legitimacy of EMU as a whole. This aspect is particularly relevant in the absence of a political 
(and fiscal) union, but not only in that context. All accomplished federations usually have 
both kinds of mechanisms in place. 
Overall, the study suggests that, however unlikely it is that political union will emerge in the 
near future, specific aspects of EMU legitimacy can be improved. While this may not 
represent the optimal solution from a legitimacy point of view, it will help to make economic 
governance in EMU more democratic and effective, and thereby help to regain citizens’ 
support, which remains the key pre-condition for a successful monetary union and for more 
dramatic changes envisaged at institutional level. 
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